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I. INTRODUCTION
A key provision of the Sarbanes·Oxley Act (Sarbanes·Oxley or "the
1
Act") creates a new standard for the imposition of a lifetime bar order against a
defendant found liable for violations of the federal securities laws. Under the Act,
any person who is found to have violated the antifraud provisions of either the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 rnay be barred from
serving as an officer or' director of a public company, "if the person 's conduct
2
demonstrates unfitness to serve."
The Act, of course, was an effort to restore public confidence in the
securities markets after a series of scandals that began with Enron 's implosion in
the fall of 2001 and continued with shocking announcements at Global Crossing,
Adelphia, WorldCom, Tyco, and Xerox in the spring and summer of2002. At the
heart of the Act are provisions designed to ensure accuracy and transparency in
financial reporting,3 timeliness in disclosure of insider transactions,4 the
\.
Sarbanes-Ox\ey Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, \\6 Stat 745 (2002).
2.
Securities Act of 1933 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (Supp. 2002); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 2l(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. 2002).
3.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2004) (requiring certification of financial statements
by an issuer's CEO and CFO).
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elimination of insider loans, and increased oversight of corporate activities by
6
directors and other gatekeepers. ln other words, the Act represents a
comprehensive effort to improve corporate executives' accountability to their
shareholders and to stimulate those shareholders to continue to invest in the carital
markets. 7 Through its forfeiture provisions 8 and enhanced criminal penalties, the
Act also seeks to punish those executives who violate the law. The provision
permitting debarment of officers and directors is a part of this potent legislative
mix.
The question that underlies the debarment provision is what conduct
demonstrates "unfitness to serve?" Does every Rule 1Ob-5 violation satisfy the
10
"unfitness" standard? No, it does not. So how can courts meaningfully identify
those violators who are deserving of a lifetime bar order? Stated another way, how
can courts determine when a Rule 1Ob-5 violator is "unfit"?
This Article sets out a useful test for courts to employ in deciding the
"unfitness" question. It draws on case law developed under a predecessor statute to
Sarbanes-Oxley. 11 It also considers the issue of executive unfitness as it has
developed in bankruptcy law, employment law, banking Jaw, and the regulation of
securities professionals. 12
The Article considers what is meant by "unfitness" specifically as it is
applied to top corporate executives. Is an executive who orchestrates a violation of
the securities laws any more "unfit to serve" than an executive who orchestrates a
violation of the antitrust laws? The environmental laws? Health and safety laws?
Congress apparently believes the answer is "yes." But what is it precisely about a
violation of the securities laws-and about the violator himself--that renders the
violator "unfit to serve"? I suggest that a matrix of factors, described in detail
below, can be helpful in answering that question.
Before setting out the matrix, however, this Article will do three things. It
will briefly review the legislative and judicial history that preceded enactment of

4.
See id. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (requiring filing of Form 4s (Statement of Changes of
Beneficial Ownership) within forty-eight hours).
5.
See id. § 78m(k) (prohibiting the extension of credit to officers or directors).
6.
See id. § 78j-1 (m) (establishing standards for members of the audit
committee and rules of professional responsibility for lawyers, respectively).
7.
See John J. Huber & Julie K. Hoffman, The Sarbanes-Ox/ey Act of2002 and
SEC Rulemaking, in I THE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (John J.
Huber et al., eds. 2004), at 1-4 ("In short, the Act is intended to be a comprehensive and
permanent solution to management malfeasance, with the ultimate goal of re-establishing
investor confidence in the integrity of corporate disclosures and financial statements.").
8.
15 u.s.c. § 7243.
9.
See Frank 0 . Bowman III, Pour encourager /es autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004)
(describing the new enhanced penalties).
I 0.
See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
II.
See infra Section II.B.
12.
See infra Section III.
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July, 2002; 13 it will survey the law of executive
unfitness in several disciplines that are germane to the Sarbanes-Oxley inquiry; 14
and it will consider the utility of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in structuring
an inquiry under the Act. 15 In Section V of the Article, I will set out a roadmap for
deciding the question of executive unfitness.
Context is important here. A finding of unfitness is unquestionably
stigmatizing. It also may have profound economic consequences. But there is more
to a lifetime bar order than merely enjoining misbehavior or assessing a fineeven a substantial fine. A lifetime bar order goes to the heart of fundamental issues
of identity. Corporate executives uneasily refer to a lifetime bar order as a kind of
"death penalty." Pete Rose has poirnantly described his lifetime exclusion from
baseball as a "prison without bars." 1
Blacklisting of any sort imposes profoundly transformative limitations on
people who, in many cases, regard their work as their life. Memoirs of writers and
actors who were blacklisted in the 1950s, for example, 17 repeatedly recount stories
of ruined marriages, substance abuse, depression, anger, and despair. 18 Studies of
white-collar layoffs during the 1980s and 1990s similarly report the trauma and
pain experienced by executives when they cannot find work commensurate with
their skills. 19
I am not suggesting that serious offenders ought not to answer for the
harm that they do. Of course they should, through the full panoply of criminal and
civil proceedings available under the securities laws. Nor am I suggesting that
there is a "right" to executive employment that is somehow infringed upon by the
13.

See infra Section II.
14.
See infra Section III.
15.
See infra Section IV.
PETE ROSE (WITH RJCK HILL), MY PRISON WITHOUT BARS (2004 ).
16.
17.
See, e.g., NORMA BARZMAN, THE RED AND THE BLACKLIST: THE INTIMATE
MEMOIR OF A HOLLYWOOD EXPATRIATE (2003); WALTER BERNSTEIN, INSIDE OUT: A
MEMOIR OF THE BLACKLIST ( 1996); ALVAH BESSIE, INQUISITION rN EDEN (1965); BRUCE
COOK, DALTON TRUMBO (1977); JOHN HENRY FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1964); BERNARD
GORDON, HOLLYWOOD EXILE, OR, How I LEARNED TO LOVE THE BLACKLIST: A MEMOIR
{Thomas Schatz ed., 1999); LILLIAN HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME ( 1976); RING LARDNER,
JR., I'D HATE MYSELF IN THE MORNING: A MEMOIR {2000); PATRICK MCGILLIGAN & PAUL
BUHLE, TENDER COMRADES: A BACKSTORYOFTHE HOLLYWOOD BLACKLIST (1997); VICTOR
S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (2003); JEAN ROUVEROL, REFUGEES FROM HOLLYWOOD: A
JOURNAL OF THE BLACKLIST YEARS (2000).
18.
In fairness, these memoirs also contain many stories of resourcefulness in
working around the blacklist, by relocating families to Mexico or Europe, or using
pseudonyms or "fronts" in writing screenplays. For those (like actors) who could not work
around the blacklist, these memoirs also describe the adaptive strategies used to find success
in other careers.
19.
See, e.g., STEPHEN FINEMAN, WHITE COLLAR UNEMPLOYMENT: IMPACT AND
STRESS 36-61 (lain Manghan ed., (1983) (detailing the negative impact of sudden
unemployment on white collar employees); CARRIE R. LEANA & DANIEL C. FELDMAN,
COPING WITH JOB LOSS: HOW INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND CoMMUNITIES RESPOND
TO LAYOFFS 45-77 (Arthur P. Brief & Benjamin Schneider eds., 1992) (describing studies
on responses to job loss, including among professionals).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 20 I merely seek to emphasize that the Ii fetime bar order is a
severe sanction.21 Given that fact, and remembering that a lifetime bar order is a
creature of civil enforcement, not criminal prosecution, courts should approach the
question of"unfitness" guided by principle and with humility. What follows is an
effort to shape that process.

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LIFETIME BAR PROVISION
A. Lifetime Bar Orders Prior to 1990
Prior to 1990, the SEC's Enforcement Division often sought lifetime bar
orders in its complaints for relief in civil enforcement actions. In many of the cases
that were settled by the Commission, defendants consented to a lifetime bar
order. 22 Oddly, though, only one published opinion included a lifetime bar order. 23
Still, the Commission was confident that it was empowered, even in the absence of
express legislative authority, to seek lifetime bar orders as a form of "ancillary
relief." This authority was finally recognized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in 1994. 24 Ironically, though, the court did not issue its opinion
until well after the passage of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
25
Stock Reform Act of 1990 (the "Remedies Act"), which expressly authorized the
Commission to seek lifetime bar orders in litigated proceedings.

20.
I am not, for example, trying to relitigate the issue of whether a lifetime bar
order is the kind of punishment that may only be imposed in a criminal proceeding. Courts
have repeatedly held that a lifetime bar order is a "remedy," not a "punishment." See, e.g.,
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 117 (1997) (holding that an administrative debarment
of banking officials does not constitute punishment); Cox v. CFTC, 138 F.3d 268, 272-74
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an administrative sanction barring a commodities trader from
trading in the commodities markets does not constitute punishment); United States v.
Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a disciplinary sanction barring a
brokerage firm employee from associating with any National Association of Securities
Dealers member firm does not constitute punishment).
21.
See Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1967). Courts have
also characterized lifetime bar orders as "harsh," "draconian," and "punitive" in nature. See,
e.g., Kenny v. SEC, 87 Fed. Appx. 608, 609 (8th Cir. 2004) ("harsh"); Proffitt v. FDIC, 200
F.3d 855, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("punitive"); Kim v. OTS, 40 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.
1994) ("draconian"); Doolittle v. Nat'! Credit Union Admin., 992 F.2d 1531, 1538 (lith
Cir. 1993) ("harsh").
22.
See Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of
1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
32, 54 n.l58 ( 1989) [hereinafter Barnard, Disenfranchising Shareholders] (listing settled
cases); Jayne W. Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve"?,
70 N .C. L. REv. 1489, 1509 n.101 (1992) [hereinafter Barnard, Substantially Unfit] (same).
SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
23.
(CCH) 1!94,501, at 95,759 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974).
24.
SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. I 077
( 1995).
25.
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
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B. Tile Remedies Act Formulation
As enacted, the Remedies Act provided that:
[Where a defendant is found to have violated ce11ain of the
securities laws J, the court may prohibit, conditionally or
unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it
shall determine, any person who violated [the applicable provisions]
from acting as an officer or director [of a public company] if the
person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an
officer or director ... _26
27

There was very little legislative history for the "substantial unfitness" provision,
though it seemed to be designed primarily for recidivists and perpetrators of
"egregious" forms of fraud. 28 Thus, the field was ripe for some classic statutory
construction.

1. The Operative Inquiry (or the "Six-Factor" Test)
The first court to consider the issue of "substantial unfitness" was the
29
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in SEC v. Shah. The
Shah case involved a defendant who had engaged in insider trading in the shares of
a pharmaceutical company of which he was a senior executive. The inside
information upon which Shah traded was that he had been paying bribes to
examiners for the Food & Drug Administration. When the bribery scheme was
disclosed, the company's share price dropped. Shah pleaded guilty in the bribery
scheme and was fined $125,000. He was also permanently barred from working
for a pharmaceutical company and barred from employment by any government
contractor for a period of three years. Shah also paid $35,000 to settle a private
lawsuit alleging insider trading.
The SEC then brought a civil enforcement action against him, seeking
further disgorgement of profits, an injunction against future violations of the
securities laws, a civil penalty, and a lifetime bar order under the Remedies Act.
After granting the SEC's first three requests, the court turned to the
lifetime bar issue. The court first articulated six items that would govern its
consideration of the demand for a lifetime bar order:
( 1) the "egregiousness" of the underlying securities law violation;
(2) the defendant's "repeat offender" status;
(3) the defendant's "role" or position when he engaged in the fraud;
( 4) the defendant's degree of scienter;

26.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2001).
27.
SEC v. Shah, No. 92-CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
1993) ("The statutes do not define 'substantial unfitness,' and the legislative history is not
instructive as to what Congress intended this term to mean." (internal citations omitted)).
28.
Barnard, Substantiaily Unfit, supra note 22, at 1510 (citing legislative

history).
29.

No. 92-CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993).
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(5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and
(6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.

30

The court then walked through each of these factors, noting particularly that
Shah's degree of scienter seemed low (he had not engaged in "clandestine trading,
such as tipping, purchasing stock in the names of other people, or trading in a
31
secret account"), and the likelihood of future misconduct on his part appeared
"relatively slight." 32 Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, and the
fact that Shah had been punished elsewhere, the court declined to enter a lifetime
33
bar order.
In a related case decided shortly after Shah, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
34
the Second Circuit modified the six-factor test somewhat. In SEC v. Pate/, the
court recognized the six-factor test in Shah as "useful in making the unfitness
35
assessment." It went on, however, to caution:
[W]e do not mean to say that [the six factors articulated in Shah] are
the only factors that may be taken into account or even that it is
necessary to apply all these factors in every case. A district court
should be afforded substantial discretion in deciding whether to
36
impose a bar to employment in a public company.
The heart of the Patel decision was the court's emphasis on the
"likelihood of future misconduct" requirement of the Shah six-factor test. The
court insisted that, as is true in any case in which the government seeks a forwardlooking injunction, a likelihood of future misconduct is "always an important
37
element in deciding whether [to order] a lifetime ban." As importantly, the court
said, in the absence of a record of recidivism or defiance of previous injunctive
orders by the defendant, the district court must "articulate the factual basis for a
finding of the likelihood of recurrence" 38 before it may enter a suspension or bar
order. In addition, the district court must consider the hierarchy of remedies
authorized by the Remedies Act and impose the least restrictive available remedy:
[T]he governing statute provides that a bar on service as an officer
or director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed
"conditionally or unconditionally" and "permanently of for such
period of time as [the court] shall determine." We take these

30.

This "six-factor test" came from that suggested in Barnard, Substantially

Unfit, supra note 22, at 1492-93.
Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *7.
31.
32.
Id.

33.
This is one of only two reported decisions in which any district court
declined to enter any type of suspension or bar order where such an order was sought by the
SEC. The other is SEC v. Pace, 173 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D. D.C. 200 I) (holding that the
defendant could be enjoined from engaging in the type of conduct proven in this case but
that the Commission had failed to establish that he should be barred).
34.
61 F.3d 137(2dCir.l995).
35.
Id. at 141.
36.
37.
38.

!d.
Id.
Id. at 142.
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provisions to suggest that, before imposing a permanent bar, the
court should consider whether a conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited
to a particular industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of
five years) might be sufficient, especially where there is no prior
history of unfitness. . . . If the district coutt decides that a
conditional ban or a ban limited in time is not warranted, it should
give reasons why a lifetime injunction is imposed. 3'l
Having set out this framework, the court remanded for a determination of whether
40
Patel was a suitable candidate for a lifetime bar order.
In the run-up to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Stephen M.
Cutler, the Director of the SEC Enforcement Division, disparaged the Patel
decision as creating "a burdensome and overly restrictive test"41 and "an
42
unreasonably high" burden for the Commission to have to meet. Cutler was
particularly disgusted by a district court's refusal, following Patel, to enter a
lifetime bar order where the defendant had been convicted of insider trading and
43
sentenced to 18 months in federal prison. In the SEC's parallel civil proceeding,
the court declined to grant a lifetime bar order against the defendant, finding that a
lesser sanction would suffice to protect the public:
Based upon the record, a permanent officer or director bar is not
appropriate. Farrell's securities violations were serious and he did
engage in fraudu\ent conduct in the hopes that his illegal activities
would not be discovered. However, upon release from prison, he
should not be barred from holding any other officer or director
positions. Farrell is a talented executive and a permanent bar would
effectively prevent him from using those talents to rebuild his life.

However, in view of Farrell's offenses, he is permanently barred
from holding an officer/director position with any banking or
financial institutions.44
45

Referring to this and a similar case, Cutler suggested " when it comes to 0 and D
bars, the courts have simply lost their way."46

2. Lifetime Bar Orders Against Defendants Who Were Officers or
Directors at the Time o[Their Misconduct
Most of the lifetime bar orders entered under the Remedies Act were
entered against officers or directors of public companies who had utilized their
39.
!d.
40.
The case was later settled, with Patel accepting a lifetime bar order in
exchange for paying a lower fine.
41.
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser Legal Works 20th Annual Federal
Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 2002), at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch538.htm.
42.
!d.
43.
SEC v. Farrell, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH}~ 99,365 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996).
44.
/d. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted}.
45.
SEC v. McCaskey, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 91,747 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 26,
2002) (prohibiting the defendant from serving as an officer or director of a public company
for a period of six years).
46.
Cutler, supra note 41.
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position to engage in fraudulent activities. In some of the cases, recidivism was a
41
salient factor. For example, in SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., a lifetime bar order
was entered against Joseph Pignatiello, the Chairman and CEO of a company
found to have overstated its value in public filings by $11.7 million. Noting that
Pignatiello was not a first-time offender, but that he had previously been
48
"restrained, censured, fined, and even imprisoned for prior securities violations,"
the court concluded a lifetime bar order was appropriate.
Other cases focused on self-enrichment. In SEC v. First Pacific
Bancorp, 49 a lifetime bar order was entered against Leonard Sands, the chairman
and CEO of a bank holding company (and a lawyer) who misdirected the proceeds
of two public offerings and also orchestrated several other transactions "which
50
greatly and artificially inflated the value of the Bank." Sands also "milked" the
company and "received substantial personal benefit from the infusion of the
51
illegally obtained proceeds."
In SEC v. Softpoint, Jnc., 52 a lifetime bar order was entered against
Ronald G. Stoecklein who, as president, chief operating officer, and director of a
software company had created millions of dollars in fictitious sales in order to
enhance his company's financial statements. "Coincident with his activities on
behalf of Softpoint, Stoecklein enriched himself through insider trading in
Softpoint common stock." 53
Other cases resulting in a lifetime bar order against senior executives
54
involved significant falsification of financial records, orchestration of a stock
55
manipulation scheme from which the executive benefited personally, and insider
56
trading in the employer's stock. In each of these cases, the fact that the defendant
47.
4 I F. Supp. 2d 505, 53 I (D. N.J. I 999).
/d. at 530.
48.
49.
142 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999).
50.
/d. at 1193.
/d. at 1191.
51.
52.
958 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), a.ff'd, 159 F.3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998).
/d. at 862. A similar case is SEC v. Solucorp Indus., 274 F. Supp. 2d 379
53.
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (officers and directors sold stock at inflated prices while falsifying the
company's financial statements).
SEC v. Scorpion Techs., Inc., Litigation Release No. J7634, 2002 SEC
54.
LEXIS 1914 (July 29, 2002) (former Comptroller barred); SEC v. Hollywood Trenz, Inc.,
Litigation Release No. 17204, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2224 (Oct. 25, 2001) (former Chairman,
President, CEO and CFO (all the same person) barred); SEC v. Sudikoff, Litigation Release
No. 16663, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1774 (Aug. 28, 2000) (former Chairman and CEO and former
president barred); SEC v. Safronchik, Litigation Release No. 15833, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1649
(Aug. 5, 1998) (former CEO barred); SEC v. Manus, Litigation Release No. 14716, 1995
SEC LEXIS 3095 (Nov. 9, 1995) (former President and former COO barred).
SEC v. Leung, Litigation Release No. 17458, 2002 SEC LEXIS 840 (April 4,
55.
2002) (former chairman and president barred); SEC v. Zubkis, Litigation Release No.
17050, 2001 SEC LEXIS 1254 (June 25, 2001) (former president and CEO barred).
SEC v. Matus, No. 4:01CV359-PB, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14225 (E.D. Tex.
56.
June 24, 2002) (former Senior Vice President of Investor Relations barred); SEC v.
Vertucci, Litigation Release No. 16565, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1055 (May 25, 2000) (former
CEO barred).
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had been an officer or director of a public company and had abused the privileges
of that position to advance the scheme (and usually to enrich himself) played a
central role in the determination ofthe sanction.
Looking at any of these cases, few would question the finding of
"substantial unfitness." Similarly, few would question the sanction selected based
upon that finding. 57 I think that one can comfortably conclude that these cases, or a
majority ofthem, were decided as Congress intended.

3. Lifetime Bar Orders Against Others
Occasionally, lifetime bar orders under the Remed ies Act were entered
against defendants who either were not officers or directors of any company, or
were officers or directors of non-public companies at the time of their wrongdoing.
In the latter category, one might consider Carl Robinson, the promoter of a
company claiming to be engaged in the sale of "mobile wireless digital personal
58
security alarm systems for cars, RV's and homes." Robinson orchestrated a sale
of unregistered stock over the internet that the court characterized as "nothing but
a polite form of theft."59 Even though Robinson had surely never served as an
officer or director of a public company, and was unlikely to be asked to do so
60
anytime soon, the magistrate judge recommended entry of a lifetime bar order.
The recommendation focused on Robinson's refusal to recognize that he had
violated the law, and also on the "flagrant, indeed one might say outrageous"
nature of his misrepresentations to investors. 61
On at least three other occasions, lifetime bar orders were entered under
the Remedies Act against defendants who were not public company officers or
directors at the time of their wrongdoing and had no apparent history of ever
having served in such a position. These defendants included a promoter who sold
62
shares in an ostrich-breeding scheme without registering the shares, organizers of
two boiler room operations that netted them $3.7 million in a pump-and-dump
scheme, 63 and organizers of an internet scheme involving the sale of$1.47 million
64
in bogus securities.
None of these cases resulted in a written decision and none were subject
to appellate review. It is therefore difficult to assess the reasoning behind the
imposition of a lifetime bar order in these cases. But it seems to me these decisions
make little sense. In the words of criminologists David Weisburd and Elin Waring,
57.
Congress offered a range of sanctions upon a finding of "substantial
unfitness." See infra Part IV, Figure 1 and accompanying text.
58.
SEC v. Robins.on, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,948 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2002).

59.
60.
61.

Jd.
Jd.
!d.

62.
SEC v. Trans-Am. Ostrich Traders, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15437, 1997
SEC LEX IS 1630 (Aug. 11, 1997).
SEC v. Tanner, Litigation Release No. 17790, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2631 (Oct.
63 .
17, 2002).
64.
SEC v. Am. Healthcare Providers, Inc. , Litigation Release No. 17530, 2002
SEC LEXIS 1359 (May 22, 2002).
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these defendants were "flim-flam artists," 65 not sophisticated or worldly men. They
had never served as an officer or director of a public company and, more
importantly, had little prospect of ever doing so, with or without the imposition of
a lifetime bar order.
One might argue, of course, that the defendants in these cases were in fact
..substantially unfit to serve" in the sense that no reasonable person would select
them to be an officer or director. Their education, skill set, social class, lack of
professional contacts, and ·inexperience in the mainstream business world all
would work against them in the market for high-level corporate appointments. So
would the federal disclosure requirements that would compel disclosure of their
prior bad acts. 66 Thus, one might argue, the bar order was nothing more to these
defendants than a harmless indignity or an act of"expressive justice."67
Are these decisions, however, really what Congress had in mind when it
passed the Remedies Act? The use of lifetime bar orders in these cases suggests
that every Rule JOb-5 violator could be found "substantially unfit" to serve as an
officer or director of a public company, a conclusion that Congress could easily
68
have reached and written into the Remedies Act but-significantly-did not.
C. The Sarhanes-Oxley Act Formulation

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act altered the provisions of the Remedies Acts in
two important respects. First, in addition to being authorized to seek suspension
bar orders in federal court proceedings, the SEC was given authority to enter
65.
DAVID WEISBURD & ELIN WARING, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL
CAREERS 80 (200 I).
See SEC Regulation S-K, Item 401(f), 17 C.F.R. § 229.40I(f) (2004)
66.
(requiring disclosure of legal proceedings brought against a director, nominee, or executive
officer, within the past five years); id. Item 401(e), § 229.40l(e) (requiring disclosure of
business experience); SEC Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2004) (requiring disclosure of
other material information).
67.
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 Y A. L.
REV. 349,383 (1997).
68.
There are several federal statutes which automatically bar a person from
specific occupations, upon a finding that they violated a federal statute. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 8902a(b)(l) (2004) (foreclosing health care providers "convicted .. . of a criminal offense
relating to fraud, corruption, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial
misconduct in connection with the delivery of a health care service" from participation in
the Medicare program); 21 U.S.C. 335a(a) (2004) (foreclosing individuals convicted of an
FDA-related felony from seeking approval for a generic drug product); 21 U.S.C. § 467
(2004) (permitting denial of food inspection services to anyone who has been convicted
within the previous ten years of a felony related to food handling or distribution); 29 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(5) (2003) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery, extortion,
embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, or violent crimes
bars the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive
board, business manager, or representative of any labor organization for at least three
years); 29 U.S.C. § llll(a)(3) (2003) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, bribery,
extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, or
violent crimes bars the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, custodian,
counsel, agent, employee or representative in any capacity of an employee benefit plan for
at least three years).
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suspension and bar orders in cease-and-desist proceedings conducted internal\y. 69
Second, the standard for entering a suspension or bar order was amended from
70
"substantial unfitness" to "unfitness." Regrettably, there is no legislative history
71
to suggest what Congress may have meant by "unfitness." Nor is there much
useful guidance from the use of the term "unfitness" in other federal statutes. 72
One thing is clear-the term "unfitness" was intended to suggest a lower standard
of proof than the previous standard under the Remedies Act. To date, however, no
73
court has had occasion to interpret the new "unfitness" standard. That is why this
Article exists-to provide guidelines for federal courts that inevitably will be
74
called upon to do so.

III.

WHAT CONDUCT CHARACTERIZES THE "UNFIT" DEFENDANT?

Now that Congress has indicated an intention to permit the imposition of
a lifetime bar order where a defendant can be shown to be unfit to serve, the
critical question is what constitutes "unfitness"? In the absence of any legislative
guidance on this issue, or any understanding that "unfitness" is a term that may be
construed with reference to other federal statutes, 75 courts must turn to analogous
areas of the law. This section explores four such areas, in which questions of
executive unfitness-though not always characterized specifically in that
69.
15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(t) (2004)~ 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2004).
70.
15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2004); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2004).
71.
See Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 Bus. LAW. 391, 407-{)8 (2004) (noting the dearth of legislative history).
72.
The term "unfit" or "unfitness" is used in several federal statutes, covering
such items as grain, livestock, railroad equipment, river steamboats, sailing vessels, medals
and lapel buttons, paper currency, buildings, cars, milk, food products, medical supplies,
spirits and wines, horses and mules, stamps, and military personnel.
One reason for this dearth of case law is the Commission's preference for
73.
seeking suspension and bar orders through a cease-and-desist proceeding rather than having
to go to court. See Barnard, supra note 71, at 401-02 (explaining why this is more attractive
to the Commission). Another reason is the high rate of settlements in SEC civil cases.
74.
Two commentators have already suggested ways of interpreting the
"unfitness" provision. Professor Langevoort has suggested that "the new statutory language
should be read in a way that presumes the propriety of a bar order from any finding of
serious, intentional securities fraud." Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations
Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post~Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VJLL. L.
REV. 1139, 1158 (2003).
A recent student note suggests that courts may construe "unfitness" in one of two
ways:
On one hand, courts could completely reject the six·part test from Patel
II and allow the SEC to issue officer and director bars almost any time
securities laws have been violated. On the other hand, courts could
interpret the change to be only a slight adjustment, and thus continue to
apply the existing test with only a slight increase in strictness.
Philip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People From Serving as
Officers and Directors of Publicly-Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56
V A.ND. L. REV. l87l, 1888 (2003).
As is obvious from what follows in the balance of this Article, I believe the issue is a
little more complex than either Professor Langevoort or Mr. Berg suggests.
75.
See supra note 72.
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language-have been at issue. It is fair to say that these bodies of decisional law
share some common themes: misuse of corporate resources, personal enrichment,
stealth and concealment, arrogance and grandiosity, and lack of contrition.
What follows is a brief survey of these areas of the law, designed to
illustrate these themes. None of the cases alone define unfitness as one might
assume Congress intended in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Taken together, however,
these cases suggest the kinds of behaviors that might form the basis for a judicial
finding of unfitness.
A. Bankruptcy Law

Questions of executive unfitness arise under federal bankruptcy law when
a corporation has filed in Chapter II, and the court considers whether incumbent
management should be replaced by a court-appointed trustee. The grounds for an
appointment include "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement
of the affairs of the debtor by current management." 76 The presumption is always
. appomtment
.
agamst
o f a trustee. 77
Courts have concluded that the criteria for removing the debtor's
executives and replacing them with a trustee are satisfied where the executives are
found to have looted the company by accepting payment of kickbacks from
vendors/8 where they have enriched themselves personally by the unauthorized
9
receipt of corporate funds/ and where they have misdirected corporate funds,
80
largely to support their extravagant lifestyles. The criteria have also been
satisfied where executives have authorized excessive compensation for themselves
81
and borrowed substantial funds from the debtor for their own use, where
executives have authorized loan forgiveness for themselves and used corporate
82
funds for purely personal expenses, and where executives have orchestrated
83
complex transactions that benefit themselves at the creditors' expense. In each of
these cases, the implicit finding has been that, due to the improper exploitation of
their executive positions for personal gain, the incumbent managers should be
replaced.
76.
II U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (2004).
77.
See In re Marvel Entm't Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 1998)
(noting that there is a "strong presumption" against appointing an outside trustee).
78.
In re Bibo, Inc., 76 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming appointment of a
trustee).
79.
In re Am. Res., Ltd., 54 B.R. 245, 246-47 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (finding
cause for appointment of a trustee).
80.
In re La Sherene, Inc., 3 B.R. 169 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding cause for
appointment of a trustee).
81.
In re N. Am. Communications, Inc., 138 B.R. 175 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1992)
(finding cause for appointment of a trustee).
In re Intercat, Inc., 247 B.R. 911 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000) (finding cause for
82.
appointment of a trustee).
83.
In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming
appointment of a trustee where, among other actions, the day before the Chapter 11 petition
was filed, management transferred $3.7 million to another corporation under management's
control and the record reflected numerous pre-petition transfers of that "amounted at best to
voidable preferences and at worst to fraudulent conveyances").
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B. Employment Law
Questions of executive unfitness arise in employment law cases when a
high-level employee is fired or demoted and sues for wrongful termination.
Typically, the defense is that the employee was fired "for cause" under the terms
of her contract. Whether the employee's termination was in fact "for cause" often
has implications for her access to stock options, severance benefits, retirement
benefits, health care coverage, and future job possibilities.
The question of what constitutes "cause" for termination is often
determined by the text of the employment contract. Sometimes the contract leaves
unfortunate loopholes. 84 Generally, however, behavior like accepting gratuities in
85
violation of company policy, utilizing employees, equipment and assets in
furtherance of personal, extra-corporate activities,86 borrowing money from the
87
company and then refusing to repay it, "deceptive conduct" regarding conflicts of
interest, 88 and misappropriation of corporate funds 89 all support a "for cause"
finding. As in the bankruptcy cases, the employment cases focus on selfenrichment at the company's expense, as well as behavior one might characterize
as "clandestine."

C. Banking Law
Questions of executive unfitness arise under federa\ banking law when
regulatory officials determine that a banking official should be removed from
office and prohibited from serving as an officer or director at any insured
depository institution. This body of law has special application to the unfitness
inquiry under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because, unlike the bankruptcy law and
employment law cases," which are company-specific, the banking law cases apply
industry-wide.
The standard for an order of prohibition has multiple elements. First,
there must have been a direct or indirect violation of a statute, administrative
order, or contractual agreement with the bank regulatory agency. 90 In the
alternative, the defendant must have engaged in unsafe or unsound lending
84.
See. e.g., Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that a continuation of benefits provision in an executive's contract did not include
a "conduct-related exception," so that he was entitled to receive his salary, health and
pension benefits notwithstanding multiple allegations of sexual harassment against him).
85.
Weiland v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 00 CIV.738, 2003 WL 22973574 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 2003) (characterizing termination of vice-president's employment as meeting the
"for cause" standard and granting summary judgment to the defendant).
86.
Ruzicka v. Hart Printing Co., 21 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(characterizing termination of vice-president and chief operating officer's employment as
meeting the "for cause" standard).
87.
Bono v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 363, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(finding vice-president's discharge to have been "for cause").
88.
O'Connor v. Certainteed Corp., No. CIV.A.87-3866, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1683 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1990) (finding grounds for a "for cause" dismissal).
89.
Sim v. Bauregard Elec. Coop, Inc., 322 So. 2d 410, 417 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(finding manager's discharge to have been "for cause").
90.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e}( I )(A}(i) (2004).
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practices or "committed or engaged in any act, omission, or practice which
91
constitutes a breach of [that person's] fiduciary duty." Second, the action must
have caused financial loss or other damage to the banking institution or resulted in
92
a financial gain to the defendant. Third, the action must have involved "personal
dishonesty" or "demonstrate willful or continuing disregard by [the person] for the
safety or soundness of [the banking institutionJ."93 These elements are known,
respectively, as "misconduct," "effect," and "culpability" and all must be proven in
94
order to support the entry of a prohibition order against a banking official. The
process does not purport to assess the defendant's current competence or whether
95
he presents a current risk of harm.
Misconduct that is merely "technical" or "inadvertent" is insufficient to
97
96
support a prohibition order. So are mere "accounting irregularities." The
general rule is that, to support a prohibition order, the bank regulatory agency must
show something more than "merely statio~ that [the defendant] violated a law or
regulation or breached his fiduciary duty." 8 It must also show the defendant acted
with "personal dishonesty," either by making affirmative misrepresentations to
other banking officials or the government or by withholding material
99
100
information. These requirements are strictly construed.
Courts have been sensitive to the fact that Congress is wary of prohibition
101
orders against banking executives.
Even so, most prohibition orders have been

91.
ld § 1818(e)(l)(A)(ii), (iii).
!d.§ 1818(e)(I)(B).
92.
/d.§ 1818(e)(l)(C). A parallel statute, applicable to the Farm Credit System,
93.
appears at id. § 2264(a).
94.
Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494, 500 (8th Cir. 1993).
95.
Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.2d 855, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also United States
v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 723 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A] debarment order may properly be said to
work rough remedial justice without a detailed prognostication regarding the probable
extent of the wrongdoer's future misconduct, if unchecked.").
96.
Oberstar, 987 F.2d at 502.
97.
Doolittle v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 992 F.2d 1531 , 1537 (lith Cir.
1993).
!d. at 1539.
98.
99.
See Van Dyke v. Bd. of Governors, 876 F.2d 1377, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that "personal dishonesty" does not require proof of civil fraud. Rather, "personal
dishonesty" "could encompass a broad range of conduct," including "misrepresentation of
facts and deliberate deception by pretense and stealth"). Backdating documents may satisfy
the "personal dishonesty" requirement. Hendrickson v. FDIC, 113 F.3d 98, I 03 (7th Cir.
1997). So may paying or receiving bribes. Cousin v. OTS, 73 F.3d 1242, 1252 (2d Cir.
1996).
I 00.
See Kim v. OTS, 40 F. 3d I 050, I 055 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacating prohibition
order for failure to show personal dishonesty).
101.
See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 926 n.l8 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing legislative
history to the effect that "[t]he power to suspend or remove an officer or director of a bank
or savings and loan association is an extraordinary power, which can do great harm to the
individual affected and to his institution and to the financial system as a whole. It must be
strictly limited and carefully guarded."); Anonymous v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 871
(D.D.C. 1985) ("[B]oth a reading of the statutory language and an examination of the
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Most prohibition

Prohibition orders have been sustained against banking officials where a
bank officer misled the bank's board about the nature of a funding scheme that he
characterized as likely to help the bank, while in fact it was an exercise in "self
104
dealing" and "for the good of [the defendant] at the expense of [the bank]";
where a bank officer falsified bank records to conceal an unlawful bonus he had
received; 105 and where a bank officer engaged in a check-kiting scheme to disguise
his significant overdrafts. 106 Prohibition orders have also been sustained where two
bank directors authorized loans to partnerships controlled by them without making
appropriate disclosures to other board members, 107 and where a bank CEO directed
payments to himself through use of the bank's "miscellaneous expense" account
and then misrepresented the use of that account in reports to the federal
government. 108 In one case, a prohibition order was sustained where a bank
director repeatedly borrowed funds in excess of the bank's lending limits, even in
the face of directives from bank examiners that he must repay the loans. 109 These
cases suggest that, as in the bankruptcy and employment law cases, the key factors
in the banking law cases are self-enrichment and non-disclosure. The banking
cases also raise issues of fraud, corruption, and outright defiance of the law.

D. Securities Law
Questions of executive unfitness arise under the federal securities laws
when an executive in a brokerage firm, an investment company, or an investment
advisory firm is barred for life from associating with any such firm. The typical
ground for entry of a lifetime bar order is that the employee "willfully violated" a
provision of the federal securities laws 110 or "willfully filed" misleading

legislative history indicate that Congress intended that the FDIC's power to remove or
suspend bank officers be carefully limited.").
102.
See, e.g., Hendrickson, 113 F.3d at 104 (noting the recent history of
mismanagement of federally insured depository institutions).
103.
E-mail from Ronald G. Schneck, Director for Special Supervision, Office of
Comptroller ofthe Currency, to Jayne W. Barnard (July 13, 2004) (on file with Author); email from John Henrie, Chief, Risk Management Applications Section, FDIC, to Jayne W.
Barnard (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with Author).
104.
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2000}, cert. denied, 531
U.S. 924 (2000) (internal quotations omitted}.
105.
Jameson v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 290,291 (5th Cir. 1991).
I 06.
Van Dyke v. Bd. of Governors, 876 F.2d 1377, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989).
l 07.
Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors, 968 F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 1992).
108.
Magee v. Greenspan, 808 F. Supp. 847,850 (D.D.C. 1991).
I 09.
Grubb v. FDIC, 34 F.3d 956 (lOth Cir. 1994). The defendant in this case
"often treated the Bank's resources as if they were his personal purse which he might
employ without regard to regulatory constraints." !d. at 961 .
II 0.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b)(2) (2004) (permitting lifetime bar of persons associated
with investment companies).
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111

documents with the Commission.
In considering whether to sanction a
defendant, the SEC typically considers several factors:
[T]he egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or
recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree of scienter involved,
the sincerity of the defendant's assurances against future violations,
the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct,
and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present
opportunities for future violations. 112
In reality, though, the SEC must establish only two things to withstand a challenge
to a lifetime bar order: first, that the defendant's violation of the securities laws
113
was "willful" and, second, that the Commission's choice of sanction was not an
abuse of discretion. 114
Given this standard, and the high degree: of deference typically accorded
115
to the Commission's decisions,
lifetime bar orders against securities
professionals have generally been upheld by the federal courts. Arguments that the
116
117
defendant was a first-time offender, or that he relied on advice of counsel,
or

Ill.
!d. § 78o(b)(4){D) (permitting lifetime bar of persons associated with a
brokerage firm); id. § 80a-9(b)( l) (permitting lifetime bar of persons associated with
investment companies); id. § 80b-3 (permitting lifetime bar of persons associated with
investment advisers).
In re Jett, Securities Act Release No. 8395, 2004 SEC LEXIS 504 (Mar. 5,
112.
2004). The factors considered by the NASD in its disciplinary proceedings against securities
professionals are similar:
I) prior or other similar misconduct; 2) attempts to conceal conversion,
misappropriation, or misuse; 3) forgery of documentation or customer's
signature; 4) duration of the period the securities or funds were
converted; 5) essentially stealing versus mistaken belief of authority to
use; 6) value of converted, misappropriated or misused funds or
securities (loss to customer); 7) prompt and voluntary restitution, clear
evidence that the funds or securities were returned to the customer; 8)
other aggravating or mitigating factors.
Otto v. SEC, 253 F.3d 960, 966 (7th Cir. 2001).
113.
"Willfulness" in this context means intentionally or recklessly committing an
act that constitutes a violation of the securities laws. The defendant need not be aware that
he is violating a specific Act or rule. Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
114.
Lowry v. SEC, 340 F.3d 501 , 504 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The court's role is to
decide only whether, under the applicable statute and the facts, the agency made ' an
allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy. '" (quoting Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608, 612 ( 1946))); Svalberg v. SEC, 876 F.2d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The main
point is that a court should not second-guess the judgment of the Commission in connection
with the imposition of sanctions, unless the [Commission] has acted contrary to law,
without basis in fact or in abuse of discretion."); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1965)
("Failing a gross abuse of discretion, the courts should not attempt to substitute their
untutored views as to what sanctions will best accord with the regulatory powers of the
Commission.").
115.
See, e.g ., Otto, 253 F.3d at 964 (describing the court's review of the SEC's
findings as "highly deferential").
116.
O'Leary v. SEC, 424 F.2d 908, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
117.
Wonsover, 205 F.3d at415.
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that he cooperated with the government and deserves a second chance,
or that
119
investors did not lose any money all have failed to persuade the courts to reverse
the entry of a lifetime bar order. Not surprisingly, courts have refused to consider
120
whether similar conduct has given rise to lesser sanctions in other cases.
Perhaps
more surprisingly, they have refused to require the Commission to demonstrate
that a lifetime bar order is the least restrictive means of protecting the investing
public. 121 That is, even though lesser sanctions (such as a finite-term suspension or
a requirement of supervision) are available under the applicable statute, the
Commission is not required to calibrate its sanctions. The upshot of all this
decisional law is that many securities professionals-street-level brokers, their
supervisors, and investment advisers-now accept a lifetime bar order by
122
consent.
In contested cases, lifetime bar orders have been upheld against
executives of brokerage or advisory firms where the vice-president of a brokerage
firm churned customers' accounts and doctored records prepared for his firm's
compliance officers, 123 where the owner of an advisory firm promoted investments
that benefited him personally without making appropriate disclosure to his
124
and where the president and vice president of a brokerage firm engaged
clients,
125
in manipulation through nominee accounts that inured to their personal benefit.
Two factors-secrecy and stubbornness-play an important role in these cases.
Secrecy appears in cases involving practices designed to avoid detection by

118.
Tager, 344 F.2d at 7-8.
I 19.
Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1184 (4th Cir. 1997).
120.
Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Lowry v. SEC, 340 F.3d
50 I, 507 (8th Cir. 2003 ); Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir. 1970). Courts may,
however, consider all kinds of unrelated misconduct in determining whether a securities
professional should be permitted to continue in the securities business. See, e.g.,
Marketlines, Inc v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding that a decade-old
disbarment was "quite relevant to a determination as to whether it is in the public interest
for [the defendant] to continue as an investment adviser").
121.
Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (lstCir. 2000).
122.
See, e.g., In re Nichols, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11534, 83 SEC Docket 449
(July I, 2004) (noting that the defendant had consented to an order barring him from
association with any broker, dealer or investment adviser); In re Hawkesworth, Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-11531, 83 SEC Docket 573 (June 30, 2004) (noting that the defendant had
consented to an order barring him from association with any broker or dealer); In re Farnell,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11510, 82 SEC Docket 3461 (June 4, 2004) (same); In re Fine,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11520, 83 SEC Docket 47 (June 15, 2004) (noting that the
defendant had consented to an order barring him from association with any broker or
dealer).
123.
Rizek, 215 F.3d at 162 ("While his customers lost $195 ,000, Rizek received
about $125,000 in commissions.").
124.
Lowry, 340 F.3d at 503. A similar case resulting in a suspension rather than a
bar order is Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[P]etitioners made
materially false statements when they claimed not to recommend securities in which they
had an ownership or sales interest, not to receive economic benefits in connection with
giving advice to clients, and not to recommend securities in which they had a fin ancial
interest.").
125.
Pagel, Inc. v. SEC, 803 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1986).
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compliance officers and regulators. 126 Stubbornness appears where the defendant
127
refuses to admit he violated the law.
The cases involving senior-level brokerage officials, like the banking
cases, suggest that a finding of unfitness may be appropriate where the defendant
has used her role and expertise to secure personal gain, and also where the
defendant has withheld material information under circumstances requiring her to
be forthcoming.

E. How These Cases Can Help Us Tltink About tile "Unfitness" Inquiry Under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The foregoing cases present some common themes. If one were to look
only at these cases, it might be reasonable to conclude that the elements of
128
"unfitness" under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should be the following:
misuse of
corporate resources; affirmative misrepresentations; stealth and concealment;
arrogance or grandiosity; personal enrichment; and lack of contrition.
Applying only these factors, one might argue that persons who
orchestrate financial reporting violations while selling their shares at inflated
prices, 129 persons who engage in insider trading in the companies they lead through
126.
Reddy v. CFTC, 191 F.3d 109, 125 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding revocation of
commodities trader's registration where the challenged transactions were "difficult to
detect").
127.
See, e.g., In re First Jersey Sec., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8699, 67 SEC
Docket 650 (May 29, 1998) (entering a lifetime bar order where the defendant "evidenced
no remorse for the massive losses he caused to unsuspecting investors"); In re Ialeggio,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8925, 67 SEC Docket 471 (May 27, 1998), aff'd, 1999 U.S. App.
LEX IS 10362 (9th Cir. May 20, 1999) (affirming the NASD's disciplinary sanction, where
the defendant "displayed neither the understanding that his conduct ... was improper, nor
remorse for his actions"); In re Osborne, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9008, 65 SEC Docket 505
(Aug. 18, 1997) (entering a lifetime bar order where the defendant "displayed no remorse or
appreciation of his misconduct"); In re Johnston, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-7528, 51 SEC
Docket 1403, at *36-37 (June 23, 1992) (entering a lifetime bar order against one defendant
where "he ha£d] no remorse for what he did, [and had] not acknowledged any wrongdoing,"
while imposing only a thirty-day suspension on another defendant who "showed remorse
for her actions" and was found by the Administrative Law Judge to be a "smart, honest
person who is much wiser today than she was during the relevant period"); In re Elliott,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-7280, 47 SEC Docket 728 (Oct. 24, 1990), aff'd 36 F.3d 86 (lith
Cir. 1994) (entering a lifetime bar order where the defendant maintained his innocence in
spite of the fact that the sentencing judge in his criminal case found that he had participated
in a "typical Ponzi scheme" and "a massive fraud"); see also Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173,
1184 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding a twelve-month suspension where the defendant insisted
that "he had done nothing wrong"); CFTC v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1381 (S.D.
Ga. 2003) (affirming an injunction where the defendant "persist[ed] in his belief that he
[had] done no wrong"); Abdo v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 2d 553, 566 (M .D.N.C. 2002)
(entering lifetime bar order against a tax preparer who "continued to assert his frivolous and
unrealistic positions" and "continu[ed] to steadfastly deny any culpability or wrongdoing").
128.
In fact, this list, though helpful, is incomplete, as l will discuss more fully in
Section V .B.
See SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (former
129.
chairman and CEO of public company is barred, following guilty plea to criminal charges of
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the use of nominee or offshore accounts, 130 and persons who, having misused their
positions as corporate officers or directors, refuse to acknowledge the nature of
their wrongdoing, 131 may reasonably be found unfit to serve under SarbanesOxley. On the other hand, one could conclude that persons swept up in financial
reporting violations but who do not personally profit therefrom, 132 persons who
engaged in garden-variety insider trading (trading in the stock of somebody else's
company based on a social or familial tip), 133 and persons who confess the error of
their misconduct, assist the government and demonstrate their contrition should
not be found unfit to serve.
Approaching "unfitness" using only these six considerations would
eliminate the need for courts to make a finding that the defendant presents a
insider trading, in light of the fact that "[he] was aware of and actively participated in the
accounting fraud resulting in an inflated stock price"); SEC v. Rice, Litigation Release No.
18815,2004 SEC LEXIS 1652 (July 30, 2004) (former CEO ofEnron Broadband agrees to
be barred where he orchestrated dissemination of misleading information then "sold large
amounts of Enron stock at the inflated levels, at a time when he knew that [his prior]
statements were false and misleading and ... was in possession of material non-public
information concerning the true status of EBS' technology and commercial success"); SEC
v. Delainey, Litigation Release No.l8435, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2592 (Oct. 30, 2003) (former
Enron executive agrees to be barred, following guilty plea to criminal charges of insider
trading from which he received some $4.26 million in unlawful proceeds). In private
securities litigation, plaintiffs state a cause of action where they can allege that "defendants
sold their own shares while at the same time misrepresenting corporate performance in
order to inflate stock prices." In re Lora! Space & Communications Ltd., Sec. Litig., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 92,696, at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2004).
130.
See SEC v. Waksal, Litigation Release No. 18026, 2003 SEC LEXIS 570
(March II, 2003) (former Imclone CEO agrees to be barred, after having directed his family
members to sell their Imclone shares in advance of an adverse FDA ruling and also
purchased put option contracts through his own Swiss brokerage account).
131.
See SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1998)
(affirming lifetime bar order where the defendant "utterly failed to recognize the wrongful
nature ofhis conduct"); SEC v. Robinson, No. 00 CIV.7452, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12811
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (recommending a lifetime bar order where the defendant
"continues to deny wrongdoing in the face of overwhelming evidence, preferr\ng instead to
claim that the SEC's entire investigation was the product of racial bias"); SEC v. Softpoint,
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (entering a lifetime bar order where the
defendant "adamantly maintain[ed] that his involvement in Softpoint's financial
manipulations was entirely legitimate or unknowing. He depict[ed) himself as an unwitting
participant in schemes concocted by . .. other Softpoint officers.").
132.
A case in point is Jamie Olis, former Senior Director-Tax Planning for
Dynegy, Inc. Olis was involved in Project Alpha, a scheme for which he was recently
sentenced to twenty-four years in federal prison. It is widely understood that Olis did not
profit personally from the scheme. Interestingly, the SEC in its civil action did not seek a
lifetime bar against Otis, or even a finite-term suspension order. (It did seek a permanent
injunction, a disgorgement order and a civil penalty.) SEC v. Foster, Litigation Release No.
18188, 2003 SEC LEX IS 1416 (June 12, 2003 ).
133.
See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 329 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming the
denial of an injunction and civil penalties for a defendant who received a tip of non-public
information and bought stock, in light of the fact that the violation was "isolated and
unsophisticated," the trader (a dentist) was "unlikely to be privy to inside information" in
the future, and he acknowledged "the wrongfulness of his conduct").
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"likelihood of future misconduct" in the role of public company officer or director.
That is, as is now done in the banking law cases, 134 district courts might take a
largely backward-looking approach to the question of unfitness rather than trying
to predict the future. Certainly such an approach would make sense since
predicting white-collar recidivism is so difficult and unreliable. Criminologists,
who have spent their careers studying recidivism, can offer little in the way of
predictive markers.
We do know that, among defendants convicted of securities fraud in a
criminal proceeding, fewer than one-quarter are ever again arrested for any
offense, including relatively common offenses such as drunk driving and nonpayment of taxes. 135 As compared to other white-collar offenders, this rate of reoffending is low. 136 We also know that defendants convicted of securities fraud
who do later recidivate often violate laws other than the securities laws. They are
not, in criminological terms, "specialists" in securities fraud. The "securities fraud
specialist" category is, in fact, quite small. 137
There is a simple explanation for this low rate of recidivism: the majority
of securities law violators are not "career criminals." As Professor Langevoort has
pointed out, many securities law violations are situational and not the product of a
corrupt or criminal character. 138 They occur because senior level executives put

134.
See supra note 95.
135.
WEISBURD & WARING, supra note 65, at 29 tbl. 2.2 (noting that, of 155
defendants convicted of securities fraud between 1976 and 1978, only 24.5% were ever
arrested following the criterion offense). In a more recent study, only 16.9% of defendants
convicted of fraud in FY 1992 were rearrested. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING
RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 13 (May 2004) (hereinafter MEASURING
RECIDIVISM], available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/recidivism_General. pdf. Such
offenders are "overall the least likely to recidivate." /d.
136.
For example, of the 119 defendants convicted of credit fraud between 1976
and 1978, 45.4% were arrested following the criterion offense. The tigure for mail fraud
defendants was 39.2%. WEISBURD & WARING, supra note 65, at 29 tbl. 2.2. Of the 968
defendants convicted of any white collar crime between I 976 and I978, 31.3% were
arrested following the criterion offense. /d. at 28 tbl. 2. I.
137.
In fact, we know very little about specialization of white collar offenders.
Studies have shown that white collar offenders "are somewhat more likely to special ize in
white-collar crimes than common offenders [are likely to specialize in common offenses],
but also display versatility in their offending." Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth Moore, Are
White Collar and Common Offenders the Same? An Empirical and Theoretical Critique ofa
Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 251, 262 ( 1992).

The most recent study of white collar offenders concludes only that "securities offenders are
more likely than others to be exclusively involved in white-collar crime .. . ." WEISBURD &
WARrNG, supra note 65 at 46.
138.
Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of
Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (noting the situational
nature of many securities frauds in the 1990s). Professor Baucus has described the kinds of
situational influences that often lead to misconduct by corporate employees-pressure from
superiors, opportunity, and the corporate culture (which she calls "predisposition"). Melissa
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pressure on subordinates to bend or ignore the rules, 139 because employees want to
be seen as "good soldiers" and "team players" so go along with their bosses'
illegal practices, 140 and because executives become committed-sometimes
irrationally-to maintaining the appearance of their company's success. 141
Contrary to popular folklore, these defendants frequently are driven as much by
loyalty (or fear) as they are by greed. 142 rt should therefore not be surprising that
the rate of re-offending by securities law violators is so low . 143

S. Baucus, Pressure, Opportunity and Predisposition: A Multivariate Model of Corporate
lllegality, 20 J. MGMT. 699 (1994).
139.
See HealthSouth Executive Pleads Guilty in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2003, at C3 (reporting that Catherine Fowler, a former cash manager and vice president
of HealthSouth, had hidden a twenty-seven million dollar transaction at the request of the
company's chief financial officer); Susan Pulliam, Over the Line: A Staffer Ordered to

Commit Fraud Balked, Then Caved-Pushed by WorldCom Bosses, Accountant Betty
Vinson Helped Cook the Books-A Confession at the Marriott, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003,
at AI (describing how a senior manager in WorldCom's accounting department was
directed by her boss to transfer $828 million from a reserve account, in violation of
accounting rules, then later was directed to make another $771 million transfer).
140.
See Peter Grant, Adelphia Insider Tells of Culture of Lies at Firm-

Government's Star Witness Says Manipulation of Reports Began Soon After Company Went
Public, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2004, at C I (noting that executives "regularly fabricated
statistics on the number of subscribers, cash flow, cable-system upgrades and other closely
followed metrics"). The company's former vice president of finance testified that he lied to
investors, lied in public filings and lied regularly in press releases, in part, because of his
close personal friendship with the firm's chief financial officer, Tim Rigas. Jd.
141.
See Former CEO Indicted in WorldCom Scandal, SEATTLE TIMES, March 3,
2004, at El (noting that, in pleading guilty to securities fraud, WorldCom CFO Scott
Sullivan told the court "I took these actions, knowing that they were wrong, in a misguided
effort to preserve the company to allow it to withstand what I believed were temporary
financial difficulties."). The 1990s saw many efforts designed to make companies' quarterly
earnings figures look better than they really were. See ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER: How
THE DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY EARNINGS CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA
(2003).
142.
See Langevoort, supra note 138, at 6 (noting that executives at Enron and
WorldCom had motives other than maintaining the value of their stock or stock options).
The fact that so many of the executives in these scandals sold only
portions of their portfolios before the collapse of their stock prices
strongly suggests that the frauds that occurred were not mainly about
personal wealth maximization. They were betting that the illusions could
indeed become self-fulfilling-that the immediate competitive gains
from shading the truth would more than compensate for any harms
flowing from a loss of credibility were the truth eventually to be
discovered. Many of these bets were predictably over-optimistic. But
most were probably made with the sense at the time that they were
aggressively consistent with the firm's interests.
/d. at6-7.
143.
There are several other reasons for the low rate of specialized recidivism
amongst securities defrauders: (I) securities fraud usually requires a good deal of time to set
up the scheme; (2) securities fraud requires specialized-and usually firm-specific-skills;
and {3) the current disclosure regime discourages firms and institutions from placing
violators in positions of trust.
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Still, there is that subset of defrauders who do recidivate, and a smaller
subset of that group who engage in new fraudulent schemes in violation of the
securities laws. How can we segregate this small group of bad actors from the
larger population of once-in-a-lifetime offenders? We know that white-collar
defendants with high-level attainments and a history of family stability are less
likely to recidivate than other white-collar defendants with a lower level of
education and a history of family dysfunction. 144 There is also some evidence that
white-collar defendants who were at the top of the corporate hierarchy at the time
of their crime may be less likely to recidivate than those at lower levels of
management. 145
Criminal history, gender, age at sentence, race and ethnicity, a stable
employment record, educational attainment, marital status, and a history of drug
146
abuse all tell us something about the likelihood of recidivism.
The reality,
however, is that our capacity to predict who is likely to recidivate-especially
among white-collar offenders-is meager. In the absence of a history of repeated
misconduct under the securities laws, or a history of abusing one's professional
position, sorting out which securities law violators are more likely than others to
recidivate-which ones present a "likelihood of future misconduct"-is really
little more than an exercise in guesswork.
So rather than urging the court to · try to predict a defendant's future
147
it might be wiser to ask the court to
behavior, as the court in Patel required,
employ a backward-looking approach to the issue of "unfitness," using parameters
like those set out above. Measuring unfitness by evaluating what the defendant has
done rather than what she might do is consistent both with criminological theory 148
and with a common sense view of just how well judges are likely to predict the
future.
There is a problem, though, with an exclusively backward-looking
approach to the unfitness issue. A lifetime bar order is expressly designed to be
remedial, 149 and to protect the public against future harm. 150 It is, the courts tell us,

144.
WElSBURD & WARING, supra note 65, at 54, tbl.3.l.
145.
/d. at 30.
146.
MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 135. Reviewing these items, women
recidivate at a lower rate than men; recidivism rates decline as age at sentencing increases;
people of color are more likely than whites to recidivate; those with stable employment in
the year prior to the criterion offense are less likely to recidivate than those who were
unemployed; offenders with college degrees are less likely to recidivate than those with
lower levels of education, and married offenders are less likely to recidivate than those who
have never married. /d. at 11-12. Offenders who receive credit for cooperating with the
government have a lower recidivism rate than those who do not. /d. at I 4.
SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995).
147.
I 48.
Here, I refer to desert-based, rather than utilitarian (deterrence-based)
theories of punishment. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
( 1993) (discussing these approaches to punishment).
149.
See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that lifetime bars are "remedial"); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 845 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a revocation of the defendant's registration with the CFTC, together
with a bar on trading, "is designed to serve remedial purposes").
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not "punishment." 151 If that is the case, then looking backward exclusively,
without making some· estimate of the likelihood of some future harm, is
inconsistent with the ostensible purpose of the sanction. 152 ln Section V, I will
return to this conundrum: courts cannot reasonably predict future misconduct, but
without such a prediction, cannot justifY imposing the Sarbanes-Oxley sanction.

IV.

WHEN

IS A LIFETIME BAR ORDER APPROPRlA TE?

Making a finding of "unfitness" under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is just the
first of a two-part process. Once a finding of "unfitness" has been made, the court
must then determine the appropriate sanction. Doing so requires recognition of the
context in which civil sanctions are imposed.
Let us assume, for example, that a defendant has been found liable for a
Rule I Ob-5 violation. The court at that point has a number of remedial options. Of
course, it may enter a damage award. 153 It may also impose a significant civil
penalty. 154 The court may also enter some type of injunction: a don't-do-it-again
injunction, 155 a categorical injunction, 156 or even a wide-ranging "obey-the-law"
injunction. 157 Then, if the court makes a finding of unfitness, it may also impose a
150.
See Furlett, 974 F .2d at 844 (noting that such orders "can be seen as an
action to ensure the integrity of the markets and protect them from people like [the
defendant1"}.
15 I.
See supra note 20.
152.
Courts have recognized in a number of contexts, that, in the absence of some
genuine risk of future misconduct, a forward-looking sanction is inappropriate. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 767, 769 (lOth Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's
denial of the SEC's request for an injunction against an accountant where "there [was] no
evidence that future violations [wereJ likely"); SEC v. Happ, 295 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196-97
(D. Mass. 2003) (refusing to enter injunction where the Commission failed to establish a
"reasonable likelihood of future violations"-the defendant's violation (insider trading) was
not egregious, he did not act "with conscious disregard to the securities law," and was
retired and no longer serving as a director of any public company); SEC v. Parks, 222 F.
Supp. 2.d 1124, 1131 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (same, where the defendant's acts were isolated, he
expressed remorse, and he had worked without problems for a registered investment adviser
for four years after the violation); SEC v. Enter. Solutions, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579
(S.D. N.Y. 2001) (same, where defendant had "no history of criminal violations, fraud, or
other misconduct, and this [was] his first experience in running a public company").
153.
See, e.g., SEC v. The Better Life Club, 995 F. Supp. 167, 179 (D.D.C. 1998)
(ordering defendants in a "Ponzi scheme" to provide restitution totaling twenty-five million
dollars).
154.
See, e.g., SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 Fed. Appx. 744 (5th Cir.
2004) (affirming the imposition of a $110,000 "third tier" civil penalty against each of the
individual defendants)~ SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming a
$500,000 civil penalty).
See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F. 3d 1215, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
155.
(affirming an injunction against further violations of section 13(d)).
156.
See, e.g., SEC v. Poirier, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2001)
(enjoining the defendant from future violations of sections 17(a) and 5(c) of the Securities
Act of 1933, sections 7(t) and t O(b} of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule I Ob-5 and
Regulation X).
157.
See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505. 530 (D.N.J.
1999) (prohibiting future violations of the securities laws).
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finite-term suspension order. 158 In the most egregious cases, it may impose a
lifetime bar order. 159 Figure l illustrates this hierarchy, placing the lifetime bar
order at the top.

Lifetime bar order

Finite-term suspension order

Injunction against any violation of the
securities laws

Injunction against a category of misconduct

Injunction against specific misconduct

Civil penalty

Damage award/disgorgement
Figure 1. Remedy Hierarchy
In the next section, 1 will argue that this process of "stacking" remedies in civil
cases is much like the process of sentence enhancement in criminal cases, and that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide useful guidance for determining the
appropriate sanction under Sarbanes-Oxley. The Sentencing Guidelines can also
shed light on the question of"unfitness."

A. The Sentence Enhancement Analogy
Although the lifetime bar provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies
only in civil cases, 160 it is appropriate to note some obvious parallels to the
158.
See, e.g., SEC v.McCaskey, No. 98 CIV. 6153,2001 WL 1029053 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2001) (ordering the defendant be barred from serving as an officer or director of a
public company for six years).
159.
See, e.g., SEC v Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 867 (S.O.N.Y. 1997)
(imposing a lifetime bar order).
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criminal law. In criminal cases, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines establish a base
offense level that may be adjusted upward or downward depending on the presence
of certain facts or circumstances. When the necessary conditions are present, a
court may "enhance" a criminal sentence, typically by increasing the fine or the
amount of prison time to be served. 161 Sentence enhancements reflect certain
aspects of the crime that permit the imposition of a greater-than-normal penalty.
For example, a sentence may be enhanced where: (l) the violator was an officer or
director of a public company at the time of the crime; 162 (2) the offense involved
50 victims or more; 163 (3) the scheme involved "sophisticated means"; 164 (4) the
violator "was an organizer or leader of a [scheme] that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive"; 165 (5) the violator engaged in an abuse of
trust or "used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense"; 166 or (6) the violator engaged in
obstruction of justice. 167 A court may depart upward, in addition, where the fraud
168
is thought to be "outside of the heartland" of conventional frauds.
The process of sentence enhancement in criminal cases is similar to the
process of determining that a defendant in a civil case merits an enhanced remedy.
That is to say, the counterpart in civil cases to the base offense level in criminal
cases is the damage award. Anything on top of that-a civil penalty, an injunction,
or a suspension or lifetime bar order-like a sentence enhancement, must be based
on findings in addition to the fact that the defendant violated the law. Thus, the
Sentencing Guidelines, and the enhancement factors that the Guidelines employ,
may be useful in thinking about the circumstances in which a lifetime bar order is,
or is not, appropriate for a defendant found to. be "unfit."

I. The Defendant's Role as an Officer or Director of a Public Company
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court is permitted to increase an
offense level by four levels where the offense involves a violation of the securities
laws and "at the time of the offense, the defendant was .. . an officer or a director
169
of a p~blicly traded company."
This provision is a product of the SarbanesOxley Act 170 and expresses a Congressional desire to visit special punishment on
160.
This includes civil enforcement actions and cease~and-desist proceedings.
161.
The Guidelines have, of course, recently been declared "advisory" rather
than mandatory. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). It is important to note that
the Booker decision does not challenge the substance--or wisdom-of the Guidelines
themselves.
162.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ("U.S.S.G.") ~ 2BI.I(b)(l5) (2004)
(increasing offense level by four).
163.
/d. § 2BI.I(b)(2)(B) (increasing offense level by four). Crimes involving 250
victims or more result in a six-level sentence enhancement. ld. § 2B l.l(b)(2)(C).
164.
/d. § 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C) (increasing offense level by two).
165.
!d. § 3Bl.l(a} (increasing offense level by four).
166.
/d. § 3B 1.3 (increasing offense level by two).
167.
/d. § 3CI.I (increasing offense level by two).
168.
ld. § 5K2.0 (granting discretion to depart upwards).
169.
!d.§ 2Bl.l(b)(I5)(A)(i).
I 70.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § II 04, 116 Stat. 745,
808 (2002).
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defendants who abuse their prestigious and lucrative positions to take advantage of
the investing public. This provision also suggests that, in civil cases, persons who
violated the securities law while an officer or director of a public company will be
more suitable candidates for a lifetime bar order than persons who did so while
serving in other capacities.

2. More Than Fifty Victims
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court is permitted to increase an
offense level by four levels where the offense involved fifty victims or more 171 and
by six levels where the offense involved 250 victims or more. 172 Though the issue
ofwhich victims count for this calculation has not yet been litigated, this provision
suggests that, in civil cases, persons involved in schemes that impact a· large
number of victims-accounting fraud in public companies, deliberate
misstatements in corporate filings and press releases, Ponzi schemes, and
fraudulent public offerings-will be more suitable candidates for a lifetime bar
order than rogue brokers, sellers of businesses, and most inside traders, who
engaged in one-on-one frauds.

3. Sophisticated Means
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court is permitted to increase an
offense level by two levels where the scheme involved "sophisticated means." 173
"Sophisticated means" is described as "especially complex or especially intricate
offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense." 174 It
may include conduct "such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the
use offictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts." 175
The "sophisticated means" adjustment has been applied to a multinational
investment scheme engineered by parties located in London, Switzerland, and the
176
Caribbean, to an embezzlement scheme involving diversion of corporate funds
into multiple secret bank accounts, 177 and to a tax evasion scheme in which a CEO
178
created fictitious business entities and falsified and destroyed corporate records.
The "sophisticated means" provision suggests that, in civil cases, persons
involved in schemes in which scores of complex transactions are required to hide
off-balance sheet financing, or that involve exotic use of derivatives, will be more

171.
U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(2)(B).
172.
/d.§ 2Bl.l(b)(2)(C).
173.
/d.§2BI.1(b)(9)(C).
174.
/d. § 2B 1.1, cmt. n.8(B).
175.
/d.
176.
United States v. Anderson, 439 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming a
six-level upward adjustment).
177.
United States v. Janecek, 86 Fed. Appx. 215,217 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming a
two-level upward adjustment).
United States v. Furkin, 119 F.3d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
178.
two-level upward adjustment).
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suitable candidates for a lifetime bar order than persons involved in less complex
179
forms of fraud.

4. Aggravating Role
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court is permitted to increase an
offense level by four levels if the defendant "was an organizer or leader of a
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise
180
extensive." This so-called "kingpin" provision allows for sentence enhancement
for those defendants who orchestrate complex and far-reaching schemes,
181
particularly those into which they have recruited other wrongdoers
or, even
.
.
I"
182
worse, unw1ttmg accomp tees.
The kingpin provision has been applied to a corporate executive who
183
involved several of his employees in frauds against the public,
to a bank
president who oq~anized a scheme involving numerous players both inside and
1 4
outside the bank, and to a CEO who misappropriated funds from his companies'
retirement plans with the assistance of lawyers who prepared phony documents to
help conceal the scheme. 185 The kingpin provision has also been used against
leaders who "inherited" a scheme from others, or who "[chose] to actively
186
participate in [an ongoing] scheme rather than put a stop to it." The essence of
the kingpin provision is the use of position and power to corrupt others and also
187
the concept of"scope" of the fraud.
179.
There is a limit to this concept. For example, the fraud in WorldCom-the
recharacterization of ordinary business expenses as capitalized items-might easily be
described as a "garden variety" fraud, but its magnitude--eleven billion dollars-puts it into
an entirely different category from small-time earnings management or other alterations of a
company's financial statements. See infra Section IV.A.6. (frauds outside of the heartland).
180.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
181.
See, e.g., United States v. Kubick, 205 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9th Cir.I999)
(affirming a four-level upward adjustment where the defendant had put together a scheme
that involved lawyers, friends, accountants, his daughter and his wife).
182.
See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 20 F.3d 367, 375 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
four-level upward adjustment where the defendant had recruited more than sixty
employees-most of them unwitting-to assist in his fraud and money laundering scheme).
183.
United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 295 F.3d 165, 170 (I st Cir. 2002) (affirming a
four-level upward adjustment where the owner of a firm oversaw the adulteration of milk
products over a seven-month period, with the unwitting assistance of chemists, employees,
and "milk industry people").
184.
United States v. Colon-Munoz, 3\8 F.3d 348, 364 ( l st Cir. 2003) (affirming
a four-level upward adjustment).
United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming a
185.
four-level upward adjustment).
United States v. DeRiggi 72 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
186.
187.
"Scope" is an issue when five or more participants cannot definitively be
identified. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 194 (3d Cir. 1998)(finding that
largest charitable fraud in history qualifies as "otherwise extensive"); United States. v.
Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398,413 (lOth Cir. 1995) (finding that a three-year bank fraud involving
140 loans and millions of dollars qualifies as "otherwise extensive"); United States v.
Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that scheme involving 2,000 investors
and eleven million dollars was "otherwise extensive").
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The kingpin provision suggests that, in civil cases, persons who engage
the services of subordinates, or involve gatekeeping professionals, to facilitate
their schemes will be more suitable candidates for a lifetime bar order than persons
who execute their schemes alone and without assistance. Also, persons who
preside over multi-entity or multi-venue schemes will be more suitable candidates
for a lifetime bar order than persons who engage in small-time local frauds.

5. Abuse of Trust or Use ofa Special Skill
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court is permitted to increase an
offense level by two levels if "the defendant abused a position of public or private
trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the
188
commission or concealment of the offense." The "abuse of trust" provision has
been applied to a CEO who exploited her ability to authorize payments and issue
189
to a President
orders to subordinates to implement an embezzlement scheme,
and a CFO who exploited their "special access to and control of [corporate]
190
checking accounts" to implement a three-year long check-kiting scheme,
and to
a President/COO who exploited his control over the company's mail system to
191
divert customer payments to his personal account.
It has also been applied to a
CEO who falsified his company's financial statements in order to secure funds
192
from his business partner, which he then converted to his personal use.
The core principle of the "abuse of trust" cases seems to be that a
defendant, who exploits her position of authority for wrongful purposes (and
especially to divert funds intended for others to her own use), should be punished
with an upward adjustment to her sentence. The use of her position is significantthe "abuse of trust" provision is not intended to be used for street-level
employees. 193
The "use of special skill'' provision has a different focus. It asks not what
position or title the defendant held at the time of the wrongdoing but what skills
she employed to execute the scheme. Often, a fraud can only occur because people
rely on the apparent expertise of the defendant or have no means of detecting
misconduct. Both the "abuse of trust" and the "use of special skill" provisions have
188.
U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3 (2004).
189.
United States v. Freeman, 86 Fed. Appx. 35 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming a twolevel "abuse of trust" sentence enhancement). See also United States v. Cameron, No.
03-1511, 2004 WL 77914 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2004) (affirming a two-level "abuse of trust"
sentence enhancement for an Executive Director of a non-profit corporation who embezzled
funds).
190.
United States v. Reid, No. CRIM.A.3:04CR00013, 2004 WL 1261454 (W.D.
Va. May 18, 2004) (overruling defendant's objections to a two-level "abuse of trust"
sentence enhancement).
191.
United States v. Bhagavan, 116 F.3d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 1997).
I 92.
United States v. Schneider, 72 Fed. Appx. 369 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming a
two-level "abuse oftrust" sentence enhancement).
193.
U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.3, cmt. n. l ("This adjustment does not apply in the case of an
embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller ... ."). Because of the potential for
overlap, where the post-Sarbanes-Oxley "officer or director of a public company"
adjustment applies, the "breach of trust" adjustment is not available. /d. § 2B 1.1, cmt.
n.I4(C).
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The breach of trust and use of special skills provisions suggest that, in
civil cases, persons whose frauds depend on their ability to direct the preparation
of false and misleading documents by others, or whose frauds depend on the
unique nature oftheir professional skills in a business setting will be more suitable
candidates for a lifetime bar order than persons who lack discretion in their job, or
persons who lack credentials.

6. Conduct Outside the "Heartland" of Conventional Frauds
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a sentencing judge may depart upward
from the Guidelines if the judge finds that "there exists an aggravating . . .
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
198
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . . . ."
Though
typically applied in cases that result in severe psychological, as well as financial,
harm to victims, 199 the upward departure provision has also been applied in fraud
cases where the victims not only lost money but suffered damage to their
professional reputations. 200 In one case, the court departed upward where the
defendant (a lawyer) disgraced his partners and his profession. 201
Upward departures also have been imposed when the defendant's crime
extended over a multi-year period and consisted of " literally hundreds of

194.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 38 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the
"use of special skill" adjustment to a lawyer); United States v. Foster, 868 F. Supp. 2 I 3, 2 I 7
(E.D. Mich. 1994)(same).
See, e.g., United States v. Fritzson, 979 F.2d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1992)
195.
(applying the "use of special skill" adjustment to an accountant); United States v. Ellis, No.
CRIM.A.95-435-4, I 997 WL 297080 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 1997) (same); see also United
States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98, I 02 (5th Cir. I 996} ("An accountant is a prime example of a
person with a special skill.").
196.
See, e.g., United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 226-28 (2d Cir. 2001)
(applying the "abuse of trust" provision to a stockbroker); United States v. Yeaman, I 94
F.3d 442, 465 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the "use of special skills adjustment" may be used
"in some circumstances" where a defendant's skills developed as a broker were used in the
commission of a securities fraud).
197.
See. e.g., United States v. Moskowitz, 215 FJd 265, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2000)
(applying the " abuse oftrust" provision to the chief financial officer of a public company).
I 98.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2004).
199.
See. e.g., United States v. Jarvis, 258 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming
a five-level upward departure where the victims of the scheme were retirees who had lost all
their savings); United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming a twolevel upward departure where "the district court found, both through testimony and its own
observation, that the victims' health suffered after they lost their life savings").
200.
United States v. Taylor, 60 Fed. Appx. 429 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming an
eight-level upward departure).
201.
United States v. Moskal, 211 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
a two-level upward departure).
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transactions," 202 or where the defendant defrauded the government of tens of
millions of dollars over a period of more than twenty years. 203
What these cases all have in common is the notion that some forms of
misconduct are simply so audacious that they warrant an increased penalty. The
concept of"outside the heartland" suggests that, in civil cases, persons who engage
in affinity fraud (including fraud on one's own employees) 204 or whose schemes
last for years or generate monumental damages will be more suitable candidates
for lifetime bar orders than persons whose schemes are conducted at arms length
and whose reach in terms of duration or dollars is limited.

7. Obstruction ofJustice
Defendants who obstruct or impede the administration of justice are
subject to a two-level increase in their base offense level. 205 The obstruction of
206
justice provision has been applied where a defendant destroys documents, lies to
207
208
209
210
investigating agents, launders funds, hides assets, or induces others to lie.
The obstruction of justice provision suggests that, in civil cases,
defendants who thwart the investigative process, destroy or hide documents, or
conceal the fruits of their scheme will be more suitable candidates for a lifetime
bar order than defendants who do not.

202.
United States v. Morberg, 863 F. Supp. 511, 517 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
(authorizing an eight-level upward departure).
203.
United States v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 853 (lith Cir. 1998) (authorizing a
two-level upward departure).
204.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, "With Friends Like These . .. . '': Toward a More
Efficacious Response to Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63,
64-65 (2001) (defining affinity fraud).
205.
U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.J (2004).
206.
United States v. Thompson, 367 F.3d 1045, 1046 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a
two-level upward adjustment).
207.
United States v. Luca, 183 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming
upward adjustment where defendant gave false documents to state officials); United States
v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming upward adjustment where
defendant made false statements to DEA agents); United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489,
1497 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming upward adjustment where defendant gave false date and
place of birth and withheld information from pretrial service officers).
208.
United States v. Dowdell, 272 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (W.O. Va. 2003)
(applying a two-level upward adjustment).
209.
United States v. Case, 180 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir: 1999) (affirming a twolevel upward adjustment where defendant withheld information regarding $1.2 million
certificate of deposit); United States v. Wu, 81 F.3d 72, 73-74 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming a
two-level upward adjustment where defendant maintained offshore accounts).
210.
United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
two-level upward adjustment where defendant suborned perjury).
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8. Factors in Mitigation
Defendants who plead guilty and cooperate with the government
sometimes receive a downward adjustment in their sentence?" Cooperation (or
"substantial assistance") typically includes providing documents, testifying at trial,
and assisting prosecutors in preparing their case against others. 212
The substantial assistance provision suggests that, in civil cases, persons
who settle and cooperate with the government may escape the imposition of a
lifetime bar order and may be subject instead to a finite-term suspension order213 or
even to no remedy-enhancement at all.
B. Why tlte Sentencing Guidelines Matter

I have digressed in this section from the "unfitness" inquiry for two
reasons: first, it is important to put the "unfitness" inquiry into context, and
second, a discussion of the factors that should influence the ultimate sanctioning
decision can also illustrate some of the factors that may influence the
determination of "unfitness." For many courts, the "unfitness" inquiry and the
determination of an appropriate sanction will overlap and may, in fact, be one and
the same. Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines not only helps shape the process
of deciding an appropriate sanction for Rule I Ob-5 violators; it may also help
shape the process of determining unfitness.

V. How SHOULD COURTS APPROACH THE UNFITNESS QUESTION?
So far this Article has considered ways in which federal district courts (or
the SEC in a cease-and-desist proceeding) might approach the two questions posed
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: when is a Rule 1Ob-5 violator "unfit to serve" and
when is an unfit defendant properly subject to a lifetime bar order as opposed to
some shorter term of disqualification? In this section, I will again focus directly on
the question of "unfitness."

2ll.
See U.S.S.G. § 3E.l.l (2004) (permitting a downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility); id. § 5K 1.1 (permitting a downward adjustment where the
government certifies that the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the
government); see also United States v. Awad, 371 F.3d 583, 586-88 (9th Cir. 2004)
(vacating sentence where district court failed to account for all of the defendant's
cooperation with the government).
212.
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 293 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934-35 (E.D.
Wise. 2003) (granting an eight-level downward adjustment where the defendant actively
participated in a sting operation, making drug buys and testifying at sentencing
proceedings); United States v. Graye, No. 02 CR.336, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1831
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2003) (noting that the defendant had provided critical documents and
testimony in an unrelated prosecution); United States v. Feeny, No. 00 CR.91-09, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20752 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2002) (noting that the defendant had helped the
prosecution build its case against five co-defendants).
213.
See, e.g., SEC v. Quattrone, Litigation Release No. 18534, 2004 SEC LEX1S
25 (Jan. 7, 2004) (imposing a lifetime bar order on the individual defendants "with the
exception of Christensen, who [will] be subject to a ten-year suspension in recognition of
his level of cooperation").
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First, I will consider the standard of proof necessary to support a
determination of unfitness. 214 Then I will sketch out the matrix of factors that
courts should apply in assessing a defendant's unfitness. 215 I will then briefly touch
on the need for specific factual findings in support of a determination of
unfitness. 216 I will conclude by exploring the importance of revisiting the unfitness
217
question after a suitable passage oftime.
In this section, I will also attempt to resolve the fundamental problem
posed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: if the lifetime bar order (or a shorter-term
suspension order) is designed to forestall future harm to the public, and not merely
to punish the defendant for her past acts, then how can courts determine which
defendants are most likely to present a genuine risk of harm to the public? One
answer is that they should do so with great caution.

A. The Government Should Be Required to Prove All the Elements by Clear and
Convincing Eviclence
Sarbanes-Oxley says nothing about the standard of proof by which
unfitness must be shown. There is a background, however, to this issue in
securities law enforcement. The first case addressing the standard of proof issue
218
was Collins Securities Corp. v. S£C, a case involving the revocation of Collins
Securities' registration as a broker-dealer and investment adviser. The evidence
adduced by the Commission staff was circumstantial, and its argument that Collins
Securities had engaged in market manipulation was largely based on inference.
Still, the Commission found against Collins Securities, utilizing a preponderance
of the evidence standard. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
noted the high stakes involved. It described the revocation of the firm's license as
a "drastic sanction[] which in effect amount[s] to a deprivation of livelihood for
the sanctioned parties."219 Given these stakes, and the allegations of fraud
underlying the disciplinary action, the court concluded that clear and convincing,
rather than preponderance of the evidence, was the appropriate standard of proof
for revocation. 220 The court remanded the case with the instruction "that all alleged
violations must be proved by the Commission with clear and convincing
evidence."221
222

The same court shortly thereafter decided Whitney v. SEC, in which the
question before the D.C. Circuit Court was whether the defendant had properly
received a nine-month suspension that prohibited him from associating with any
broker or dealer. Refusing to authorize a lower standard of proof in suspension
cases than the standard of proof applicable to revocation cases, the court

214.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra Section V.D.
See infra Section V.E.
562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
!d. at 823.
/d.
/d. at 827 (emphasis added).
604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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reaffirmed its view that any incapacitation-type sanction of this sort "must be
223
sustained by clear and convincing evidence."
224

The next case, Steadman v. SEC,
involved a defendant appealing an
order by the Commission barring him permanently from associating with any
investment adviser, prohibiting his affiliation with any registered investment
company, and suspending him for one year from associating with any broker or
225
dealer.
His primary argument was that the Commission had employed a
preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing
standard in assessing the claims against him. The U .S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected Steadman's argument and affirmed the bar order against him,
thereby creating a circuit split. The Fifth Circuit took the position that "[i]f the
burden of proof imposed on the Commission is too high, its ability to police the
industry is impaired." 226
A divided U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Steadman.

227

The Court noted

first that,
Where Congress has not prescribed the degree of proof which must
be adduced by the proponent of a rule or order to carry its burden of
persuasion in an administrative proceeding, this Court has felt at
liberty to prescribe the standard, for "[i]t is the kind of ~uestion
2 8
which has traditionally been left to the Judiciary to resolve." -

It then concluded that, in the case of Commission proceedings against regulated
professionals, Congress had prescribed a standard of proof in the text of the
29
Administrative Procedure Ace and that the appropriate standard of proof was
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, "many of [Steadman's policy-based]
arguments [were] simply inapposite."230 Justices Powell and Stewart dissented,
arguing in part that the Administrative Procedure Act had been enacted several
years after the securities laws upon which Steadman's disqualification was based
and consequently "should have no bearing on the proof burden in this case." 231

Steadman might be cited for the proposition that all lifetime bar cases
should be governed by a preponderance ofthe evidence standard. In fact, however,
the Steadman decision is inapplicable to judicial proceedings under the SarbanesOxley Act. That is, the Steadman decision was based on specific statutory
language not present in Sarbanes-Oxley and applicable only to administrative

223.
!d. at 681.
603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 450 U.S. 91 ( 1981 ).
224.
225.
!d. at 1128.
226.
!d. at 1139.
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
227.
228.
!d. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284
( 1966).
/d. at 96. The Act provided that "[a] sanction may not be imposed .. . except
229.
on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by
and in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.'' 5 U.S .C. § 556(d)
(2004).
230.
Steadman, 450 U.S. at 96 n.l 0.
231.
!d. at 106.
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32

proceedings? Also, Steadman held only that the underlying violations must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. That is a very different issue than
whether "unfitness to serve" must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence or
some higher standard of proof, or whether the need for a lifetime bar order must be
proved by a preponderance ofthe evidence or some higher standard of proof.
Courts have long recognized that in circumstances like this-in which
the defendant faces both stigma and a loss of some liberty (economic or
otherwise)-the appropriate standard of proof is clear and convincing:
[The Supreme Court] has mandated an intermediate standard of
proof-"clear and convincing evidence"-when the individual
interests at stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly
important" and "more substantial than mere loss ofmoney."233
Accordingly, all three elements of the Sarbanes-Oxley inquiry-the underlying
violation, the question of "unfitness," and the issue of an appropriate remedyshould all be required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

I. The Underlying Violation
The most useful analogy to the lifetime bar order is the revocation of a
professional license. 234 In these cases, courts have commonly held that the
underlying claims must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. For example,
235
charges necessary to sustain the revocation of a teacher's license,
charges
236
necessary to support the revocation of a physician's license,
charges necessary
to support the revocation of other professional licenses, 237 and charges necessary to
238
support the disbarment of a lawyer all must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.

232.
See supra note 229.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
233.
234.
Similarly, the most useful analogy to a finite-term suspension order under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a suspension of a professional license.
235.
Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987).
236.
Nguyen v. State, 29 P.3d 689, 708 (Wash. 2001); Webb v. W. Va. Bd. of
Med., 569 S.E.2d 225, 231 (W. Va. 2002).
237.
See, e.g., Am. Legion Post #134 v. Miss. Gaming Comm'n, 798 So. 2d 445,
456 (Miss. 2001) (applying a clear and convincing standard to the revocation of a bingo
license); Nims v. Bd. of Registration, 53 P.2d 52, 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring that
grounds for revoking an engineer's license be established by clear and convincing
evidence); see also In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 934 (Wash. 1999) (applying a clear
and convincing standard to discipline of a sitting judge). But see Coleman v. Anne Arundel
County Police Dep't, 797 A.2d 770, 795 (Md. 2002) (concluding that a preponderance of
the evidence standard is sufficient for terminating a police officer's contract); Pretzer v.
Motor Vehicle Bd., 125 S.W.3d 23, 39 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), afl'd in part and rev'd in part,
138 S. W.3d 908 (Tex. 2004) (holding that standard for revocation of a license to sell motor
vehicles is only a preponderance of the evidence).
238.
Burton v. Motto lese, 835 A.2d 998, 1024 (Conn. 2003 ); N.C. State Bar v.
Talford, 556 S.E.2d 344, 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); In re Crosland, 577 S.E.2d 214, 214
(S.C. 2003).
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License revocation, however, is not the only appropriate analogy. Courts
have recognized that, where a remedy is proposed in a civil case that will limit a
defendant's personal autonomy, a clear and convincing standard of proof is
39
required. For example, where a defendant faces civil commitment/ or is at risk
240
of losing his citizenship status, or where the state seeks to declare a defendant a
sexually violent predator, 241 the applicable standard of proof in each case is clear
and convincing. And even where the issue is "merely" money, the standard of
proof for an enhanced damage award-such as punitive dama~es-is often clear

and convincing and not just a preponderance of the evidence. 42 Taken together,
these cases suggest that, to support any form of occupational incapacitation, the
SEC should be held to an enhanced standard of proof in presenting the elements of
the underlying offense.

2. "Unfitness"
A defendant who has violated Rule 1Ob-5 may or may not be unfit to
serve as an officer or director of a public company. That is, when the Commission
is seeking a lifetime bar order, a finding of unfitness is a separate element in the
case, requiring separate evidence. "Unfitness" is a state encompassing moral and
professional failings of the defendant. Allegations of unfitness must therefore be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case too, analogies are helpful. For example, a parent's "unfitness"
to retain parental rights in her children, 243 an executive's "unfitness" to remain in
control of a debtor-in-possession in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding/44 and a
bar applicant's "unfitness" to practice law 245 are all governed by the clear and
246
convincing standard of proof. So are allegations of "actual malice,"
civil
248
contempt, 247 and "bad faith,"
all of which embody some sense of moral
239.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-33 (1979).
240.
Federenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 504 (1981 ); see also United States
v. Lindert, 907 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ohio. 1995) (upholding defendant's citizenship status
where the government failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence).
241.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A2d 962, 966 (Pa. 2003).
242.
See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, &23-25 (6th
Cir. 2004) (noting in an appendix that, as of 2004, thirty-one states have adopted a clearand-convincing standard of proof for an award of punitive damages).
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that a
243.
clear and convincing standard is necessary to protect the parents' due process rights); In re
D.C., 807 N .E.2d 472 (Ill. 2004) (holding that it is necessary to find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit with respect to each child, before parental
rights to that child may be terminated).
244.
See, e.g. , In re G-1 Holdings, Inc., 295 B.R. 502, 507 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting
that "[i]n every motion to appoint a trustee . . . , the movant must prove the need for a
trustee by clear and convincing evidence").
245.
See, e.g., In re Triffin, 701 A.2d 907, 913 (N.J. 1997) (holding that "unless
evidence of unfitness is clear and convincing, . . . 'admission to the bar should be
allowed'").
246.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285- 86 (1964) (holding that
actual malice must be shown with "convincing clarity").
247.
FTC v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 754 (lOth Cir. 2004) (holding that proof
of contempt must be shown by clear and convincing evidence).
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shortcoming. Unfitness to serve as an officer or director should be subjected to the
same high standard of proof and for the $~me reasons: a finding of unfitness
249
implicates a person's reputation, not just his pocket-book;
the potential for an
250
erroneous judgment is high; and the interests at stake are significant.

3. The Need for a Lifelong Sanction
The use of a clear and convincing standard is not merely prudential. It is
constitutionally-mandated. The appropriate standard of proof is determined by the
Due Process Clause, taking into account the magnitude of what is at stake for the
defendant. For example, a preponderance of the evidence standard may suffice to
support the entry of a simple damage award. 251 A beyond a reasonable doubt
252
standard is required when the interest at stake is the defendant's freedom.
In
between these extremes is an intermediate standard of proof--clear and
convincing. This is the standard that courts must apply when something more than
253
money (or even a job) is at stake.
The function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the fact-finder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."254 A clear
and convincing standard ensures that the court recognizes the gravity of the
decision before it, and approaches that decision with an appropriate level of
caution. It also ensures that the court does not place undue emphasis on "a few
255
isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyncratic behavior."

248.
Pape v. Local 390, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that
claims that a trusteeship imposed by the international union was imposed in bad faith must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
249.
Note that, for this reason, allegations of fraud often must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Illinois ex rei. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600,
620 (2003) (applying Illinois law).
250.
See Barnard, Substantially Unfit, supra note 22, at 1520 (discussing why
courts in deciding questions like "unfitness" are far more likely to sanction defendants for
whom incapacitation is unnecessary ("false positives"} than to fail to sanction defendants
for whom it is appropriate ("false negatives")).
251.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965
(Cal. 2003) (distinguishing between the burden of proof for punitive damages-clear and
convincing evidence-and the burde11 of proof for compensatory damages-preponderance
of the evidence).
252.
See, e.g., In re Winship, 297 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (noting that a defendant
may not be convicted "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
253.
See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 29 P.3d 689, 697 (Wash. 200 I) ("[Revocation of a
medical license involves] much more than the Joss of a specific job. It involves the
professional's substantial interest to practice within his profession, his reputation, his
livelihood, and his financial and emotional future. [That is why) the constitutional minimum
standard of proof in a professional disciplinary proceeding for a medical doctor must be
something more than a mere preponderance [of the evidence] .").
254.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
255.
Id at 427.
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The decision under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, once the court has found that
the defendant is "unfit," is whether the defendant should be barred from competing
for thousands of well-paying job opportunities for the remainder of his lifetime. 256
Just as in the license revocation cases, it is fair to argue as a matter of due process
that the standard of proof that such a sanction is necessary should be clear and
convincing. There may even be an equal protection claim for a defendant subjected
to a preponderance of the evidence standard when other professionals (like doctors
and lawyers) are protected by a clear and convincing standard. 257

B. Courts Sl10uld Consider Several Factors in Evaluating Unfitness
So far in this Article, we have considered the nature of "unfitness," both
as a matter of substance (for example, under banking law) and as a matter of
process (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence). We have also looked
at how the penalty-enhancement regime of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
might suggest a way in which courts should approach the remedy-enhancement
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. Taking all of these factors into account, we will
now turn to the task of setting out a framework for making the unfitness inquiry.
My prescription-one that focuses on the issues and experiences
underlying Sarbanes-Oxley and also takes into account the societal judgments
embodied in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-involves the following nine
factors: 258 (l) the nature and complexity of the scheme; (2) the defendant's role in
the scheme; (3) the use of corporate resources in executing the scheme; (4) the
defendant's financial gain (or loss avoidance) from the scheme; (5) the loss to
investors and others as a result of the scheme; (6) whether the scheme represents
an isolated occurrence or a pattern of misconduct; (7) the defendant's use of stealth
and concealment; (8) the defendant's history of business and related misconduct;
and (9) the defendant's acknowledgment of wrongdoing and the credibility of his
contrition. This list is not exhaustive, and none of these factors is dispositive.259
256.
Currently, there are over 16,000 reporting companies. Douglas M. Branson,
Enron-When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate
Governance Reform?, 48 VJLL. L. REv. 989, 990 (2003). If each has four officers (probably
a low estimate) and five non-officer directors, this represents over 140,000 jobs that are offlimits to barred defendants.
Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Wyo. 2000) (holding, under
257.
Wyoming law, that a physician is entitled to application of the same clear and convincing
standard of proof as is applied to dentists, nurses, pharmacists, optometrists, veterinarians,
attorneys, architects, land surveyors, and engineers).
258.
A similar list governs the debarment of tax preparers. See Abdo v. IRS, 234
F. Supp. 2d 553, 565 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that, in deciding whether such an order is
appropriate, courts assess the following factors: "(I) the gravity of harm caused by the
offense; (2) the extent of the defendant' s participation and his degree of scienter; (3) the
isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction and the likelihood that the defendant's
customary business activities might again involve him in such transactions; (4) the
defendant's recognition of his own culpability; and (5) the sincerity of his assurances
against future violations" (internal quotations omitted)).
259.
See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e do not mean to say
that the enumerated factors are the only factors that may be taken into account or even that
it is necessary to apply all these factors in every case. A district court should be afforded
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1. The Nature and Complexity ofthe Scheme
Some Rule l Ob-5 violations are straightforward; other violations are more
elaborate. For example, assume that a business executive passes along some useful
information to an intimate friend, with the expectation that she will trade on that
information. 260 By contrast, assume that a business executive engages in an
elaborate accounting scheme, utilizing dozens of corporate shells, hundreds of
transactions and sophisticated (and non-transparent) off-balance sheet financing
techniques, from which he profits personally by some forty million dollars. 261
Although both courses of conduct are Rule l Ob-5 violations and both involve
scienter, the first scheme might not lead to the conclusion that the defendant is
unfit to serve as an officer or director of a public company. 262 The second scheme
263
seems unquestionably deserving of a lifetime bar order.
One difference between the schemes, of course, is the isolated nature of
the first defendant's (illegal) indiscretion and the ongoing, protracted (and cynical)
nature of the second defendant's scheme. Another distinction, however, is between
the simplicity of the first scheme and the complexity of the second. Complexity
should play an important role in unfitness determinations. The more complex a
securities fraud scheme, the more one may reasonably conclude that the defendant
acted with a high degree of scienter. Complexity may also rely upon the
defendant's sophistication and use of special skills. Complexity also fosters
concealment and obfuscation. As a proxy for many of the most harmful aspects of
a securities law violation, complexity should be the primary factor in any unfitness
inquiry. Schemes that involve scores of people, dozens of entities, and deliberate
falsification of thousands of records264 should reasonably lead to a finding of
unfitness, especially when some ofthe other factors listed below are present.
substantial discretion in deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a public
company.").
260.
See In re Thayer, Litigation Release No. I 0746, 1985 SEC LEXIS 1597
(May 7, 1985). This case involved former LTV Corp. Chairman Paul Thayer.
See SEC v. Fastow, Litigation Release No. 18543, 2004 SEC LEXIS 75 (Jan.
261.
14, 2004). According to the complaint, Andrew Fastow, former CFO of Enron Corporation,
"participated in a series of fraudulent transactions. Three of the transactions . . . were part of
an alleged scheme to hide Fastow's interest in and control of certain entities in order to
avoid consolidating those entities in Enron' s financial statements. This was done, according
to the complaint, for self-enrichment and to mislead analysts, rating agencies, and others
about Enron's true financial condition."
262.
After serving nineteen months in prison, Paul Thayer joined the boards of
two public companies. William P. Barrett, Picking Up the Pieces, FORBES, Aug. I 0, 1987, at
113.
263.
Fastow has been sentenced to ten years in prison, and has consented to the
entry of a lifetime bar order.
264.
See, e.g., SEC v. Colwell, Litigation Release No. 18403, 2003 SEC LEXIS
2400 (Oct. 9, 2003) (barring the former Chief Accounting Officer of Enron North America)
("As alleged in the complaint, Colwell, along with others at Enron, engaged in a wide
ranging scheme to defraud by manipulating Enron's publicly reported earnings through a
variety of devices designed to produce materially false and misleading financial results.
This scheme included the misuse of reserve accounts, concealment of losses, inflation of
asset values, and deliberate use of improper accounting treatment for transactions."); SEC v.

48

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 47:9

2. The Defendant's Role in the Scheme
When it comes to the question of the defendant's role in a Rule I Ob-5
violation, the court must address two subsidiary questions: did the defendant
participate in the scheme in her capacity as an officer or director of a public
company, and was the defendant the organizer or leader of the scheme?
The first question focuses on whether the defendant exploited her position
as an officer or director of a public company in order to orchestrate the fraud.
Often, the answer is no. Accountants, lawyers, stockbrokers, business promoters,
and others are often defendants in Rule 1Ob-5 cases. For them, the presumption
should be that they are neither "unfit to serve as an officer or director" nor suitable
candidates for a lifetime bar order. This presumption may be rebutted where the
defendant's role in the scheme was similar to that of an officer or director-she
was the organizing force behind the scheme, she directed and recruited other
people into the scheme, and she employed multiple competencies in executing the
scheme; she has the educational and professional background that would render
her suitable for an officer or director's position; and a limited-term suspension
order (or "cooling-off period") is insufficient to protect the public.
As for those who were an officer or director of a public company at the
time they violated Rule l Ob-5, that fact alone should not compel a finding of
unfitness. As noted above, Congress could easily have written a law that
automatically triggered such a finding-but it did not. 265 A defendant's status as an
officer or director, however, is an important factor to consider in a Rule 1Ob-5
case, both because it suggests an abuse of a position of trust and also because it
often suggests that the defendant acted as a "kingpin" in the scheme.
The second aspect of the " role" inquiry-regardless of whether the
defendant was an officer or director-is the question of leadership in the scheme.
66
The Sentencing Guidelines (through the kingpin provisionl recognize that
persons who orchestrate frauds are more blameworthy than persons who merely
follow directions, even if the subordinates know their actions are wrong. Thus, a
junior level executive who is directed by his superiors to alter a corporation's
financial statements in order to deceive investors may reasonably be punished for
having done so, and certainly witt be challenged in the marketplace for managerial
employment, but there is little need-subject to the other factors set out in this
Article-to conclude that such a person is unfit. 267 A senior level executive who

Kopper, Litigation Release No. 17692, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2159 (Aug. 21, 2002) (barring a
former high ranking executive at Enron Corporation) ("As alleged in the complaint, starting
in at least early 1997, Kopper and others used complex structures, straw men, hidden
payments, and secured loans to create the appearance that certain entities that Kopper and
others at Enron funded and controlled were independent of Enron. This allowed Enron to
move its interests in these entities off its balance sheet when, in fact, those interests should
have been consolidated into Enron's financial statements.").
265.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
266.
See supra Section IV.A4.
267.
Note that the SEC did not seek a lifetime bar order against Betty Vinson, the
accountant who altered $1.5 billion worth of transactions in WorldCom's financial
statements and did not seek any relief against Catherine Fowler, the vice-president who
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directs subordinates to engage in unlawful conduct, on the other hand, should be a
268
much stronger candidate for a finding of unfitness.
.

3. The Use of Corporate Resources in Executing the Scheme
Misusing corporate resources should be an important feature of the
unfitness inquiry. Not every corporate employee who participates in a fraud does
so on company time or through the use of corporate information. The same is true
269
of corporate officers and directors.
When such persons violate the securities
laws in a manner that is entirely coincidental to their institutional positions, there
would seem little need-save a symbolic one-to subject them to a lifetime bar
order.
The government might argue that the Sentencing Guidelines impose an
enhanced penalty on defendants who engage in securities law violations while
officers or directors of public companies, without regard to whether their crime
270
involved an abuse of their corporate position. The Sentencing Guidelines in that
regard are overbroad, in my view. Violations that are coincidental to a defendant's
position as an officer or director, and that do not involve a breach of fiduciary
duties, should not be punished to the same degree as violations that depend on the
privileges of office. Stated another way, the mere fortuity that the defendant is a
highly-placed executive should not necessarily result in a penalty-enhancement,
any more than would be the case if the defendant were a doctor or schoolteacher.

altered twenty-seven million dollars worth of transactions in HealthSouth's financial
statements. Vinson did, however, consent to be barred from appearing before the
Commission under Rule 102(e). SEC v. Vinson, Litigation Release No. 17883, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 3119 (Dec. 6, 2002) (suspending Vinson from appearing or practicing before the
Commission as an accountant).
See SEC v. Harris, Litigation Release No. 18700, 2004 SEC LEXIS 951
268.
(May 10, 2004) (entering a lifetime bar order against the former group vice president of
HealthSouth Corporation, where he "directed HealthSouth employees to make false
accounting entries to inflate reported operating results"); SEC v. Sullivan, Litigation
Release No. 18605, 2004 SEC LEXIS 493 (Mar. 2, 2004) (entering a lifetime bar order
against former CFO of WorldCom, where he " instructed subordinates to book certain
fraudulent adjustments and entries in WorldCom's general ledger"); SEC v. Martin,
Litigation Release No. 18339, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2152 (Sept. 10, 2003) (entering a lifetime
bar order against a former CFO of HealthSouth, where he "directed lower level accounting
personnel to make false entries to HealthSouth 's accounting books and records"); SEC v.
Allaire, Litigation Release No. 18174, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1352 (June 5, 2003) (entering a
lifetime bar order against former CFO of Xerox Corpration, where he "directed or allowed
lower ranking defendants in Xerox's financial department to make accounting adjustments
to results reported from operating divisions to accelerate revenues and increase earnings").
269.
A good example is Martha Stewart, who is alleged by the SEC to have
engaged in insider trading in Imclone stock. There is no allegation that she utilized the
resources of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. in making that trade. Still, the
Enforcement Division is seeking a lifetime bar order against her serving as a director of any
public company, and a bar limiting her activities as an officer of MSLO. SEC v. Stewart,
Litigation Release No. 18169,2003 SEC LEXIS 1333 (June 4. 2003).
270.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the fact that a securities law violator was an officer or director
at the time of the violation may be a legitimate factor to consider in determining
"unfitness" under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. That fact alone, however, is not enough
to warrant a remedy-enhancement. The Commission's current practice of routinely
seeking lifetime bar orders against corporate executives in civil cases may make
sense as a matter of expressive justice, but would seem, in the absence of other
factors set forth in this Article, to be an exercise in overreaching.

4. The Defendant's Financial Gain (or Loss Avoidance) from the Scheme
In all the cases we looked at in Section Ill, a common theme running
throughout was self-enrichment. Thus, and not surprisingly, self-enrichment
should be a key factor in any unfitness inquiry. Self-enrichment is contrary to basic
concepts of agency, undermines investors' confidence in corporate leadership,
and-without full and timely disclosure-violates the compact between managers
and owners.
Not all securities law violators profit from their wrongdoing, of course.
Pumping up a company's financial statements without accompanying reward does
occur. So does tipping without a quid pro quo. But in most Rule 1Ob-5 cases,
violators achieve a measurable profit (or avoid a measurable loss), which is usually
subject to an order of disgorgement. The rule of thumb should be, the greater the
benefit unlawfully extracted from the scheme, the more likely the defendant is to
be found "unfit."

5. The Loss to Investors and Others as a Result of the Scheme
A key element of the "unfitness" inquiry under the Remedies Act was
how much harm the defendant had caused in the marketplace. 271 The concept of
harm was not well-developed in the case law under the Remedies Act, nor will it
be here. Suffice it to say that harm is disputable territory, raising issues both of
loss causation (as construed in the Rule 1Ob-5 cases) 272 and "actual loss" (as
construed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 273 All other things being
equal, however, a big-ticket scheme should more frequently lead to a finding of

271.
See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 517 (D.N..J.
1999) (entering a lifetime bar order where the defendant had orchestrated an asset
restatement totaling $11.9 million); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), afl'd, 159 F.3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998) (entering a lifetime bar order where the
defendant's conduct "involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, and deliberate disregard of
regulatory requirements, and because his conduct created a significant risk of substantial
losses to others").
272.
See generally John F. X. Peloso & Francis S. Chaplowski, Loss Causation:
Who Was Responsible for the Market Bubble?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 2003, at 3 (exploring
recent loss causation cases). See also Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (June 28, 2004).
273.
See generally Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just In Crime: Guiding Economic
Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 402-03
(2003) (tracing the development of a workable definition of "actual loss" for sentencing
purposes); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms:
An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 38-39 (200 I) (same).
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unfitness than a sm·all scheme. A scheme that imposes harm on a wide range of
victims is a more suitable predicate for a finding of unfitness than a scheme with a
single victim.

6. Whether the Defendant's Conduct Represents an Isolated Act or a
Pattern of Misconduct
Certainly, recidivism is an important factor in determining whether a
defendant is unfit. Indeed, the problem of recidivism was the primary motivator for
the enactment of the Remedies Act in 1990 and an essential element in a number
of lifetime bar orders entered under that Act. 274 It is fair to say that, where an
executive defendant has a history of significant violations of the securities laws, a
finding of unfitness will almost always be appropriate. The harder question will be
how to deal with first offenders, a question to which we will return ·when we
275
consider the difficult problem of prediction.

7. The Defendant's Use ofStealth and Concealment
76

Just as all frauds involve some abuse of trust/ all frauds involve some
degree of stealth and concealment. Still, some forms of stealth are more significant
than others. Certainly, falsification of documents (either during or in order to
conceal the fraud), suborning perjury by employees and others, lying to the
government, expatriating proceeds to offshore accounts, and lying to employees
about the nature of their actions should all be positive factors in a finding of
unfitness. Defendants whose conduct over an extended period of time evidences
their intention to deceive others and cover up their wrongdoing should be strong
277
candidates for a finding of unfitness.

8. The Defendant's History of Business Misconduct
In deciding whether a defendant is unfit, the court may reasonably inquire
into issues going beyond the immediate complaint. In this context, there is nothing
inappropriate about the admission of extrinsic evidence. 278 The court may wish to
274.
See, e.g., Chester Holdings Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 531 (D.N.J. 1999)
(entering a lifetime bar order after noting that the defendant "[hadJ been restrained,
censured, fined, and even imprisoned for prior securities violations and is currently facing
criminal charges); SEC v. First Pac. Ban corp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (entering
a lifetime bar order after noting that the defendant had been a recidivist).
275 .
See infra Section V.C.
276.
See United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2003).
277.
See Mark Maremont, Rite-Aid's Ex-CEO Sentenced to 8 Years for
Accounting Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2004, at A3 (describing the actions of Martin L.
Grass, former CEO of Rite-Aid). "[Grass] directed a two-year conspiracy to cover up his
misdeeds. Among other things, . . . the former chief executive 'persuaded a cadre of
witnesses' to commit perjury, submitted false evidence to investigators and created a bogus,
backdated document to cover up a self-dealing land purchase." ld. In a parallel civil
proceeding, Grass has accepted a lifetime bar order. SEC v. Bergonzi, Litigation Release
No. 18728, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1094 (May 27, 2004).
278.
See Barnard, Substantially Unfit, supra note 22, at 1504--05 (suggesting that
"a broad inquiry into the defendant' s overall behavior" is appropriate in the remedies phase
of a civil case).
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gather "character" evidence about the defendant, as well as evidence about the
defendant's conduct in other business and professional settings.
This kind of evidence can be quite illuminating. Ivan Boesky, for
279
Sam
example, had a history of deception and questionable business dealings.
Waksal, too, was revealed to have engaged in a pattern of corner-cutting and
280
duplicity throughout his scientific and professional career. Some might even say
that Martha Stewart has evidenced unsavory character traits-imperiousness,
ambition, and an obsession with detail. 281 (Ironically, the very same characteristics
have been ascribed to Jack Welch, who has been lionized as one of America's
finest CEOs.) It is entirely legitimate for courts to consider evidence of this nature,
for it goes to the very heart of the question of "unfitness."

9. The Defendant's Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing and the Credibility
of His Contrition
Embedded in any finding of unfitness is an inevitable moral judgment.
Whatever else is on the table, a finding of unfitness involves at least an intuition
that the defendant is a sufficiently bad person that she should be incapacitated or
else she will generate further social harm. One means of countering that intuition is
to persuade the fact-finder that the defendant appreciates the wrongfulness of her
conduct, sincerely regrets it, and will not repeat it. Courts may call this "remorse,"
"contrition," or "acceptance of responsibility," but it is a concept familiar to
federal district judges. They often reward "substantial and meaningful contrition"
by reducing the monetary penalties in civil cases. 282 They may also reward
acceptance of responsibility by reducing the sentences in criminal cases. 283
Experienced judges know what to look for when assessing a defendant's
expression of contrition and remorse. 284 The focus of the inquiry should be
279.
See JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF
MICHAEL MILKEN 68 ( 1992) ("Boesky sat on SEC panels when he was committing his most
outrageous crimes. He did nothing to discourage his guests at the Harvard Club from
believing he had spent years in Cambridge. He charged his investors high management fees
and then defrauded them by making some of his most profitable trades through an entity
that siphoned their gains to his account; later, in order to pay his lawyers, he may have
defrauded his employees by draining $5 million to $10 million out of their salary-and-bonus
account. He listed himself as an adjunct professor at Columbia University's Graduate
School of Business when he was no more than a guest lecturer.").
280.
See ALEX PRUD'HOMME, THE CELL GAME: SAM WAKSAL'S FAST MONEY AND
FALSE PROMISES-AND THE FATE OF IMCLONE'S CANCER DRUG (2004).
281.
See CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, MARTHA, INC.: THE lNCREDlBLE STORY OF
MARTHA STEWART LIVING 0MNJMEDIA (2002); JERRY OPPENHEIMER, MARTHA STEWART:
JUST DESSERTS: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY (2003).
282.
See, e.g., SEC v. Inorganic Recycling Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 92,269, at
14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002) (concluding that the appropriate civil penalty for a defendant
who demonstrated "substantial and meaningful contrition" was "zero").
283.
See, e.g., United States v. Weeks, No. OO-CR.91-21 , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20277, *41 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2003) (reducing the base offense level by three levels where
the defendant "has shown recognition of responsibility for the offense").
284.
Two critics have recently argued that the issue of remorse is particularly
subject to bias and favoritism on the part of judges. Stephanos Bibas & Richard
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whether the defendant "has accepted responsibility for his conduct in a moral
sense," 285 and not just given lip service to the concept. Contrition alone should not
avoid a finding of unfitness, but sincere contrition may mitigate other positive
factors from the preceding list.
C. Tlte Problem of Prediction

The reader will note that none of the nine factors listed so far goes
directly to the question whether, if left unimpeded, the defendant is likely to
engage in future violations of Rule 1Ob-5. I have deliberately avoided including
such findings in the proposed test for "unfitness" for two reasons: first, many
courts' a finding of a "likelihood offuture misconduct" are really a measure ofthe
severity of the defendant's prior misconduct, rather than a sincere effort to predict
the future; and second, even sincere efforts to predict the future often involve little
more than guesswork. I am reluctant to invite courts to engage in this kind of
286
prognostication, even though it frequently occurs in injunction cases. Predictions
are particularly difficult in the case of first offenders.
We know, for example, that first offenders have demonstrably lower
recidivism rates than other offenders, regardless of the nature of their crime?87
Recidivism is particularly rare for first offenders whose offense is some type of
288
fraud.
This pattern would suggest that first offenders should almost never be
subject to a finding of a likelihood of future misconduct. There is a problem,
though, with that approach. Many of the most notorious offenders whose activities
Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology Into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85
(2004). Still, "a district court' s assessment of witness credibility [on such matters as
remorse] is quintessentially a judgment call and virtually unassailable on appeal." United
States v. Causor-Serrato, 234 F.3d 384, 390 (8th Cir. 2000).
285.
United States v. Bosque, 312 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 2002).
286.
See, e.g., CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F .2d 1211, 1220 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979) (reversing
and remanding lower court's denial of an injunction against the offspring of W.H. and N.B.
Hunt, even though they had never traded in commodities, where "[i]t is not unlikely that
they, either personally or with the advice of the Hunt family financial counselors, will be in
a position to violate the regulation in the future"); SEC v. Berger, 244 F . Supp. 2d 180,193
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), ajf'd, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (entering a permanent injunction where
"because of his history and experience in the securities markets, there is reason to believe
that [the defendant] might attempt to return to investment activity in the future'').
MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 135, at 15. In a recent study, the
287.
recidivism rate for offenders with zero criminal history points prior to their criterion offense
was 11. 7%, compared to 22.6% for offenders with only one criminal history point and
36.5% for offenders with two or more points. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RECIDIVISM AND
THE "FIRST OFFENDER": A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 13-14 (May, 2004) [hereinafter
RECIDIVISM AND THE "FIRST OFFENDER"]. For those offenders who had never experienced
even a single arrest, the recidivism rate was only 6.8%. /d. at 14.
288.
Among defendants convicted of fraud, the rate of recidivism for detendants
who, prior to their fraud offense, were in Criminal History Category (CHC) I (essentially
first offenders) was 9.3%. For defendants in CHC II, the rate of recidivism was 26.3%, for
Category III, the rate was 33.8%, for Category IV, the rate was 42.3%, for Category V, the
rate was 51 .2% and for Category VI, the rate was 53.4%. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra
note 135, at 30, exhibit 11.
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gave rise to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were first offenders. 289 These
are precisely the people, it would seem, at whom the lifetime bar provisions of the
Act were directed. Should the fact that these men and women are first offenders, or
the fact that there may be no legitimate basis for predicting future misconduct on
their part, preclude the entry of a lifetime bar order? I think not.
Some Rule I Ob-5 violators may seem like unlikely candidates for a
lifetime bar order because they are in jail; they are so tarnished and notorious that
they are unlikely to be placed in a position where they can do much more harm~ or
they have grown too old to be viable candidates in the market for executive
employment. As a practical matter, there might be no need for a lifetime bar order
in these cases to ensure that these offenders will not become an officer or director
or orchestrate a significant fraud in that capacity. But refusing to find these
defendants "unfit to serve" because they are unlikely to be hired as an officer or
director cannot be the right result in these cases. Defendants in the past have
argued that a pending term in prison, or a change in jobs, or the defendant's
advanced age should excuse them from prospective sanctions in civil proceedings.
Courts in those cases have correctly rejected those arguments. 290
Still, we must remember that occupational incapacitation orders are
291
intended to be remedial, not punitive, and exist to protect the public. There must
be some justification for incapacitating a defendant beyond the mere fact that she
has recently broken the law.
I therefore suggest an alternative to the "likelihood of future misconduct"
test. For first offenders, I suggest the following: a first offender whose fraud has
been "outside the heartland" of conventional frauds, either because of its
289.
Consider Andrew Fastow, for example, who is about to go away for ten years
in prison.
290.
See, e.g., SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1034 (1984) (reversing denial of an injunction, where the district court erroneously
relied on defendant's change of occupation as a controlling factor); SEC v. Bonastia, 614
F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 698 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 {1978) (holding that "neither changing jobs nor
deterioration of health, in and of itself, or in combination with the cessation of illegal
activities and proclaimed reformation, provides a complete defense to an injunction suit");
SEC v. Dimensional Entm't Corp., 518 F. Supp. 773, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (entering a
permanent injunction against the defendant, even though he had more than six years of a
prison sentence yet to serve); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F. 2d 62, 80 n.34 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (affirming the entry of a permanent injunction, notwithstanding that the
defendant was in his mid-seventies).
291.
See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 108 F.Jd 1162,1164 (9th Cir. 1997)
(asserting that a lifetime bar on associating with a brokerage firm was imposed "to protect
the investing public against .. . manipulative activity by those in the securities industry who
have a fiduciary obligation to their customers"); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 104 (1997) (asserting that a prohibition order against a banker serves "to promote the
stability of the banking industry"); Cox v. CFTC, 138 F.3d 268, 273 (7th Cir. 1998)
(asserting that a lifetime bar on trading in commodities "primarily serves the civil goal of
protecting the integrity of the public markets"); cf Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 88 (2003)
(noting that a statute requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement
authorities serves "the non-punitive purpose of 'public safety"').
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magnitude or its impact on investors, in which he has been the driving and
organizing force (or "kingpin"), and for which he expresses no credible contrition
292
A first
or remorse, may be a suitable candidate for a finding of unfitness.
offender whose fraud is more limited, in which he has been just one of several
low-level players, and for which he offers credible remorse, should not be found
unfit to serve.
What though, of those first offenders who fall in between the kingpin and
"just-following-orders" ends of the spectrum? Here, courts should consider
whether the defendant's behavior represents a one-time act of opportunism or a
more committed act of lawlessness. Historically, this distinction has been
293
characterized as one between an " isolated act" and a "pattern ofwrongdoing."
Criminologists frame the issue somewhat differently, however,
distinguishing between "crisis responders," "opportunity takers," "opportunity
294
seekers," and "chronic offenders," each being less blameworthy than the next.
Courts in the context of a Sarbanes-Oxley inquiry should attempt to make the same
distinction and sanction only those defendants who, by their conduct and attitude
both in business and before the court, have demonstrated that they are "opportunity
seekers" or worse. Factors that might bear on the question of whether a first
offender is an "opportunity seeker," and is therefore a more suitable candidate for
a finding of unfitness than someone who is merely an "opportunity taker," are: the
complexity and duration ofthe scheme; the defendant's position in the hierarchy of
292.
An example might be Kenneth Lay, former Chairman of Enron. After finally
being charged in connection with Enron's collapse (eleven counts of conspiracy and fraud)
in July, 2004, Lay immediately called a press conference in which he "firmly r~ject[ed] any
notion that [he] engaged in any wrongful or criminal activity." Enron 's Ken Lay: Cuffed But
Confident, USA TODAY, July 9, 2004, at lB. While taking responsibility for his failure to
save the company, he insisted his conduct "does not equate to a crime." Kara Scannell &
Rebecca Smith, Former Enron CEO Makes His Case on Television, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2004, at B I. Another example may be Richard Scrushy, former Chairman of Health South,
Inc., who appeared on 60 Minutes to proclaim his innocence and also created a website in
which he insists he is "absolutely not guilty." See Richard Scrushy, News Service: Setting
the Record Straight, at http://www.richardscrushy.com.
Compare CFTC v. Wall Street Underground, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1260,
293.
1273 (D. Kan. 2003) (entering injunction where defendant's conduct was " not founded on a
single incident, but [was) systematic and integral to defendant's business"), with SEC v.
Globus Group, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 134 7 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (refusing to enter
injunction where SEC action was based on "isolated, as opposed to recurrent, violations of
the securities laws" ). See also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 19 (2d Cir. 1977)
(affirming denial of injunction where the defendant's inappropriate disclosure was "merely
one instance of misconduct not likely to recur").
294.
WEISBURD & WARING, supra note 65 at 58. A "crisis responder" is someone
who responds to a personal or professional crisis by resorting to crime. !d. at 59. An
"opportunity taker" commits a crime because a sudden or unusual opportunity arises that is
too good to pass up. /d. at 64. An "opportunity seeker" spends considerable time imagining
and engineering fraudulent schemes. /d. at 78. A "chronic offender" is a person who has a
demonstrated record of recidivism. See id. at 53, 74. See also Alex R. Piquero et at., The
Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 464 (2003) (noting the distinction
between "desistors" (those with relatively low recidivism possibilities) and "persisters"
(those with relatively high recidivism probabilities)}.
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the scheme; the defendant's role as an initiator of the scheme; the degree of stealth
and concealment involved; and the defem!ant's lack of contrition.
Looking to identify "opportunity seekers" is less exacting, perhaps, than
the Patel court's insistence on a specific finding of a likelihood of future
misconduct. 295 It is more exacting, however, than the banking cases' exclusive
reliance on backward-looking observations. 296 And it seems at least minimally
97
consistent with the courts' desire to ensure market integrit/ or market stability 298
299
and to protect the public when they have entered lifetime bar orders in the past.
Distinguishing between opportunity seekers (who may be unfit because they are
likely to continue to look for ways to abuse or disrupt the capital markets) and
opportunity takers (whose wrongs are situational and unlikely to be repeated) may
not be a perfect solution to the problem of prediction, but it seems to be the best a
court can hope to do.

D. Courts Slwulcl Enter Specific Findings Supporting a Conclusion of Unfitness
No matter how the specific facts break down under the "unfitness" test I
have proposed in this Article, the court should make written findings to support
300
any ultimate finding of unfitness.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit insisted on such findings under the Remedies Act. 301 Certainly, when the
finding of unfitness is made by an administrative agency, that agency should be
required to "specify how [the defendant's] conduct demonstrated his unfitness to
302
serve as an officer or director." It must "provide some explanation of why [the
defendant] is unfit to serve." 303
The reasons for insisting that courts document the basis for a finding of
unfitness are easy to understand. First, it disciplines the trial court to consider
carefully whether its conclusion is based on something more than retributive
impulse. It also provides a record upon which a reviewing court may test the
reasonableness ofthe trial court's conclusion. 304

295.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
296.
Cox v. CFTC, 138 F.3d 268, 273 (7th Cir. 1998); Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d
297.
1173, 1179 (4th Cir. 1997).
298.
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997).
United States v. Merriam, I08 F. 3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997).
299.
300.
See FED. R. C1v. P. 52(a) (requiring courts to prepare findings of facts).
301.
Taking into account the "loss of livelihood and the stigma attached to
permanent exclusion from the corporate suite," the Court of Appeals required the district
court to "articulate the factual basis for a finding of substantial unfitness." SEC v. Patel, 61
F.3d at 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995).
302.
Doolittle v. Nat'! Credit Union Admin., 992 F.2d 1531, 1538 (II th Cir.
1993).
303.
/d.
304.
See Armstrong v. CFTC, 12 F.3d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the
purposes for requiring written finding in administrative agency adjudications are "to prevent
arbitrary agency decisions, provide parties with a reasoned explanation for those decisions,
settle the law for future cases, and [to furnish] a basis for effective judicial review").
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E. Courts Shoulll Be Open to Revisiting the Unfitness Question
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides no provision for the trial court to revisit
the question of unfitness. By cortrast, both the federal banking laws305 and the
laws governing securities professionals306 each provide a mechanism for amending
307
or revoking a lifetime bar order. So do statutes similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in the
308
United Kingdom and Australia.
305.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(B) (2004) (permitting the lifting of a
prohibition order where the regulatory agency consents).
306.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(c) (the investment company statute) (providing
that a person debarred from serving as an employee, officer or director of an investment
company may seek an exemption from such an order upon a showing that the sanction is
"unduly or disproportionately severe" or that "the conduct of such person has been such as
not to make it against the public interest or protection of investors to grant such an
application").
307.
These statutes are rarely, but occasionally, invoked. See, e.g., In re Wien,
Exchange Act Release No. 49000, 2003 SEC LEXIS 3087 (Dec. 29, 2003) (vacating a 1982
order barring the defendant from associating with any broker, dealer, investment company,
investment adviser or municipal securities dealer); In re Cozzolino, Exchange Act Release
No. 4900 I, 2003 SEC LEX IS 3083 (Dec. 29, 2003) (vacating a 1974 order barring the
defendant from associating with any broker or dealer except as a supervised employee in a
non-supervisory capacity).
The factors to be considered in reviewing a petition to lift a bar order
against a securities professional include (I) the nature of the misconduct
at issue in the underlying matter (more serious and extensive allegations
militate against relief); (2) the time that has passed since issuance of the
administrative bar; (3) the compliance record of, and any regulatory
interest in, the petitioner since issuance of the administrative bar; ( 4) the
age and securities industry experience of the petitioner, and the extent to
which the Commission has granted prior relief from the administrative
bar; (5) whether the petitioner has identified verifiable, unanticipated
consequences of the bar; (6) the position and persuasiveness of the
Division of Enforcement as expressed in response to the petition for
relief; and (7) whether there exists any other circumstance that would
cause the requested relief from the administrative bar to be inconsistent
with the public interest or the protection of investors.
In re Wien, Exchange Act Release No. 49000, 2003 SEC LEX IS 3087 (Dec. 29, 2003 ).
As for banking cases, see In re Chu, 2003 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 12 (Feb. 28, 2003)
(terminating a prohibition order entered in 1999), and In re Feinberg, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 42 (July 7, 1998) (terminating a prohibition order entered in 1974).
The factors to be considered in reviewing a petition to terminate a prohibition order
are: (I) the applicant's current fitness to participate in the banking industry; (2) whether the
applicant's participation would pose a risk to an institution ' s safety and soundness; and (3)
whether the applicant's participation would erode public confidence in an institution. In re
Lawson, 2003 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 127 (Sept. 8, 2003).
See, e.g., Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, ch. 46, § I (I)
308.
(U.K.) (permitting the court to grant leave to a disqualified person to serve as director or
administrator of a company or to "take part in the promotion, formation, or management of
a company"); Corporations Act, 200 I, § 206G (Austl.) {permitting the court to grant leave
to certain disqualified persons to manage a particular corporation, a particular class of
corporations, or any corporation). Leave is sometimes granted at the time the bar order is
entered, and sometimes following a period of rehabilitation. See In re China Jazz
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The existence of these models might support an argument that, if
Congress had wanted to create a mechanism to re-open unfitness determinations in
litigated proceedings, it surely could have done so, but deliberately chose not to.
One might counter, however, that defendants subject to a lifetime bar order have
an inherent right to request a revisitation of the question of their unfitness, perhaps
on the theory that an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness denies the defendant
309
31
due process or perhaps on some other due process theory.
Certainly, there is
an existing right for litigants to seek review of the terms of any court-ordered
injunction. An injunction may be lifted when "it is no longer equitable that the
injunction should have prospective application." 311

°

I am not suggesting that it should be easy to lift the bar. For example, a
312
period of good behavior should not be enough, on its own, to lift the bar.
Something more, like an extended period of exemplary performance in a business
setting, payment of restitution to known victims, and a strong showing of peer
support and confidence may be required. 313 But it should be possible, after a

Worldwide Pic, 2003 WL 23145273 (Ch. D.) (leave granted immediately); In re
Realisations Ltd., 1999 WL 1142774 (leave granted after passage of several months).
309.
See, e.g., Windy City Meat Co. v. USDA, 926 F.2d 672, 678, 680 (7th Cir.
1991) (suggesting that a per se rule that would result in termination of meat inspection
services without affording the defendant a chance to adduce mitigating evidence may
violate the due process clause); but see Black v. Snow, 272 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29, 33 (D.D.C.
2003) (holding that statute barring all convicted felons from possessing firearms does not
violate the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and that "recent developments in constitutional
law have significantly limited, if not altogether abrogated, the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine").
310.
One case suggesting such an argument was dismissed on procedural grounds
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Czura v. Supreme Court, 813 F.2d 644 (4th Cir.
1987), a disbarred attorney challenged the denial of his petition for readmission and, by
inference, a state statute that prohibited readmission after disbarment. He argued that the
statute violated his rights to due process and equal protection, "including his rights to be
rehabilitated and to practice his profession." Apart from procedural roadblocks, substantive
law also presents some challenges in this area. See, e.g., Demore· v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003) (upholding a statute requiring the detention of deportable aliens, notwithstanding
petitioner's claim that the scheme's failure to permit him to prove that he is neither a danger
to society nor a flight risk deprives him of rights under the due process clause); Connecticut
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (upholding a sexual offender registration statute, notwithstanding
petitioner's claim that the scheme's failure to permit him to prove that he is not "currently
dangerous" deprives him of rights under the due process clause); Ruggiero v. FCC, 3 I 7
F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding an order barring a person who had engaged in the
unlicensed operation of a radio station from receiving a low-power FM radio license,
notwithstanding petitioner's claim that treating former "pirates" differently than other
license applicants with different types of FCC violations in their past constituted a denial of
equal protection).
311.
FED. R. CJV. P. 60(b)(5). In order to invoke this rule, the movant must show a
significant change in factual conditions. Life Techs., Inc. v. Promega Corp., 189 F.R.D.
334, 336 (D. Md. 1999).
SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F.2d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 1976).
312.
313.
A similar burden is imposed on lawyers seeking readmission to the bar. See
generally Kimberly A. Lacey, Note, Second Chances: The Procedure, Principles. and
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reasonable period oftime, for a person barred from serving as an officer or director
to demonstrate her ability and desire to serve with honor. The burden for her will
be to persuade the court, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is no longer
314
"unfit to serve." It would be fair, in addition, to suggest that "the more egregious
the misconduct [underlying the bar order], the heavier an applicant's burden to
.
.
.
prove his or her present fitness . .. .315
The chance to revisit the unfitness question after a reasonable passage of
time not only reflects a recognition of the possibility of rehabilitation and
reintegration-a classic American idea1 316-it also may prove very advantageous
for investors in the long run. Consider Michael Milken, who, following his
317
imprisonment on multiple counts of securities fraud in 1990, went on to lead
318
with distinction several non-profit and for-profit organizations. Or consider Ilan
Reich, who pleaded guilty to insider trading in 1987, spent seven months in federal
prison, and was disbarred. He later was reinstated to the bar and has since become
319
the chief executive officer of two successful public companies.
Even Barry
Minkow, who spent seven years in federal prison for orchestrating an elaborate
fraud at ZZZZ Best Company as a young man, is now consulting with the FBI to
help ferret out others engaged in frauds much like the one he concocted in the late
1980s. 320 There are hundreds of stories of wrongdoers who have been
Problems With Reinstatement ofAttorneys After Disbarment, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1117
(2001).
314.
See, e.g., Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re: L.H.H., 660 So. 2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (Fla.
1995) (applying a clear and convincing standard ofproofto disbarred attorney's petition for
reinstatement); In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 299 (S.D. 1997) (same); see also In re Lawson,
2003 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 127 (Sept. 8, 2003) (noting that "[a]n applicant seeking
modification or termination or an order of prohibition bears a 'strong burden' of proof as to
his or her current fitness"); Mohr v. White, 756 N .E.2d 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (applying a
clear and convincing standard of proof to driver's petition for reinstatement of driving
privileges).
315.
In re Robbins, 836 P.2d 965, 966 (Ariz. 1992).
316.
In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush declared
" America is the land of{the] second chance." President George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address (January 20, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/
01/20040 120-7.html.
317.
The specific charges were conspiracy with Ivan Boesky; aiding and abetting
the filing of false statements; aiding and abetting the evasion of net capital rules (all these
counts had to do with stock "parking" for Boesky); securities fraud for concealing the
ownership of MCA stock~ mail fraud ; and assisting the filing of a false tax return. JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 436 ( 1991 ).
318.
See Greg Burns, The Boss: Back in the Game, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2004, at
C1 (describing the public policy work of the Milken Institute); Michael Olesker, Michael
Mi/ken 's Second Act Will Be a Tough One to Top, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2004, at 1B
(recounting Milken 's philanthropies and his leadership of Knowledge Universe, "a mix of
companies specializing in early childhood education"); Rita Rubin, Now Just Call Him Mr.
Philanthropist, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 25, 1995, at 90 (describing his role as
founder and leader of the Association for the Cure of Ca ncer of the Prostate).
319.
Steven Brill, Redemption?, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 4 (reporting on Reich' s
life ten years after his insider trading was discovered).
320.
Jeff D. Opdyke, Former White-Collar Felon 's Insights Reap Redemption,
WALL. ST. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at Cl. According to the former federal prosecutor who handled
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rehabilitated-some are reinstated to the bar,321 some go on to a life of community
service, 322 and some even get elected to public office. 323 The point is, rehabilitation
is possible and the prospect of removal from the SEC's blacklist in recognition of
that rehabilitation could be a powerful motivator for good.
As it is now, barred persons often circumvent lifetime bar orders by
serving as "senior advisors" 324 or other euphemisms in lieu of serving as an officer
or director. Ifthey have value to add in the marketplace, however, and are playing
roles similar to officers or directors, they ought to be given the opportunity to do
so openly and legally. Permitting them to serve as officers and directors wouJd also
subject them to enforceable fiduciary duties and disclosure requirements, whereas
now they are subject only to the terms oftheir contracts. In this respect, lifting the
bar has the potential to serve investors and protect shareholder value.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The record of the SEC Enforcement Division, both before and since the
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, reveals the view that any Rule I Ob-5 violator
can be declared "unfit" if the Division says so and that every defendant the
Division declares "unfit" should be barred for life from serving as an officer or
director of a public company.
This Article advances a different view. First, it sets out a framework for
approaching the "unfitness" question under Sarbanes-Oxley. It uses terms and
concepts with which federal judges are already familiar. More importantly, it sets
out a principled and systematic set of nine factors qesigned to help courts
distinguish between those Rule lOb-S violators whose conduct justifies the
conclusion that they are unfit to serve as an officer or director and those offenders
(a far greater number) whose conduct does not merit the draconian sanction of
debarment.

Minkow's case, "Barry appears to be one of those people who truly turned their life

around." /d.
321.
See, e.g., Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re P.T.R., 662 So. 2d 334,338 (Fla. 1995).
322.
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, A Policy Whose Time Has Passed?, HUMAN RIGHTS,
Winter, 2004 (noting the story of a former felon-originally sentenced to a term of life in
prison-who was recently named Citizen of the Year by the Montgomery, Alabama, Bar
Association).
323.
See, e.g., New America Foundation, Events: The State of Statehouse
Democracy: A Discussion of a Recent Run for a Low Visibility Public Office, at
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=event&eveiD=234 (last visited Dec, 8, 2004)
(noting the recent election of a candidate who had been disbarred as a lawyer and had his
real estate license revoked). One of Chicago's greatest mayors, Harold Washington, was
elected even though his lawyer's license had been suspended for five years as a result of his
failure to file federal income tax returns.
324.
See Mara Der Hovanesian, Fred Joseph is Back in Business, Bus. WK., July
14, 2003, at 84 (noting that, after being barred from serving as an officer of a financial
services company, Joseph served as a "senior adviser" to such a company).

